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THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991. A CONTINUATION OF
THE WARDS COVE STANDARD OF BUSINESS NECESSITY9
On November 21, 1991, President George Bush signed into
law broad civil rights legislation, amending Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964' and section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866.2 Observers labeled the new law, known as the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 (the "1991 Act"), 3 a compromise between the
Bush Administration and the Democratic congressional leadership.4 Both sides, however, claimed victory-the Congress in
crafting new legislation to expand workers' rights5 and the Republican White House in signing a civil rights bill that would
not require employers to fill quotas.'

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), amended by 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (Supp. III 1991).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988), amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (Supp.
III 1991).
3. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-16 (Supp. III 1991)). The bill that President Bush signed was submitted orginally in the Senate as S. 1745.
4. See, e.g., Pamela Fessler et al., Rights Bill Rises from the Ashes of Senate's
Thomas Fight, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3124 (1991); Ruth Marcus, Compromise on
Civil Rights Bill Skirts Controversial Definition, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1991, at A6;
White House Announces Civil Rights Compromise Ending Two-Year Long Dispute,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 208, at A-11 (Oct. 28, 1991).
5. Civil rights advocates wanted to overturn five Supreme Court decisions that
worked to restrict employees' ability to successfully sue employers over workplace
discrimination. The most important of these Supreme Court decisions was Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atomo, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text. Other important cases included: Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that discrimination in the performance of employment contracts is not prohibited explicitly under existing federal law); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (limiting the previous interpretation of federal law
regarding the ability of workers to challenge discriminatory seniority systems); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (expanding the ability of workers not affected by
discrimination to challenge agreements made between previously discriminatory employers and the discriminated party); and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989) (holding that employment decisions based on both discriminatory and
non-discrimnatory reasons may be valid if the employer proves it would have made
the same decision based solely on the non-discriminatory factors).
6. Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1701, 1701 (Nov. 21, 1991); see also C. Boyden Gray, Civil Rights: We Won,
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Facially, the new law represented the culmination of the best
of the American political system: the ability of the elected
branches of government to forge a compromise for the good of
the nation. The aftermath of this alleged compromise, however,
may yet reveal a failure of the elected branches to address adequately the issues of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
The potential failure lies arguably in the most important
provision of the Act, the "business necessity" standard by which
employers legitimately may use employment practices that
disproportionately impact minority employees.7 The Act's drafters were intentionally unclear. The actual statutory language
never defines business necessity, but merely refers to an "interpretive memorandum" located in the CongressionalRecord.8 The
interpretive memorandum itself provides little guidance, stating
[is] intended to reflect
that the "term[] 'business necessity'
the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonzo." 9 Unfortunately, the interpretation of business necessity prior to Wards Cove was not well
defined.1"
The ambiguity of the "business necessity" standard ensures
that the federal courts will have to interpret the Act's intent,1
and ultimately that the unelected judiciary will determine the
true effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Ironically, from the
beginning Congress intended that the Act supersede the role of
the Supreme Court." Even more ironically, the Civil Rights Act

They Capitulated, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1991, at A23.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075.
8. Id.
9. 137 CONG. REC. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (interpretive memorandum
as introduced by Sen. Danforth) (citation omitted). See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 23-44 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, Lawyers Expect Ambiguities in New Rights Law to
Bring Years of Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1991, at A20; Al Kamen, Despite Bill's
Signing, Fight Has Just Begun; Second Front Opens Over Rights Law's Meaning,
WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1991, at A14; Robert Pear, With Rights Act Comes Fight to
Clarify Congress's Intent, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1991, at Al.
12. See H.R. REP No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 14 (1991) (stating the
purpose of the Act was "to respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by restoring federal civil rights protections against employment discrimination"); see also
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of 1991 may well prove to be a Bush Administration victory, a
surprising result in view of the fact that most observers initially

judged President Bush the loser in the passage of the Act. 3
This Note examines the 1991 Act's business necessity standard and the Supreme Court's likely interpretation of tins standard. The Note splits its focus between a discussion of competing
theories of statutory interpretation and the application of those
theories to the definition of business necessity under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. The discussion of the various interpretive
methods is of interest because a controversial approach to statutory interpretation is gaining prominence among the federal
judiciary The application of those competing interpretive theories to the Act is necessary for practitioners seeking guidance in
future litigation.
The Note continues with a general discussion of disparate
impact law and the events surrounding the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 followed by a look at the tension and
conflict created by the Act. It then examines specific methods of
judicial interpretation and applies the most promnnent method
to the specifics of the 1991 Act's business necessity standard.
Finally, tis Note analyzes judicial interpretation methods and
discusses winch is the most appropriate to apply and why

Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (stating
in the Act's "findings" that the Court's decision in Wards Cove "weakened the scope
and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections").
13. See, e.g., William T. Coleman, Jr. & Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., How the Civil
Rights Bill Was Really Passed; The Administration Did Compromise, WASH. POST,
Nov. 18, 1991, at A21; Ann Devroy, Bush Saw Gains in Deal, Officials Say; President Sought to Score Domestic Victory, Avoid Veto Showdown, WASH. POST, Oct. 26,
1991, at Al; William Raspberry, Bush, Civil Rights and the Specter of David Duke,
WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1991, at A23. But see Gray, supra note 6, at A23 (arguing
that "on
fundamental issues the president won a near victory for equal opportunity"); see also infra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF TITLE VII, THE LAW OF DISPARATE IMPACT,
AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991

The roots of the debate over the Civil Rights Act of 199114 lay
in the unsuccessful attempt to pass a similar law in 1990. Congressional Democrats drafted the Civil Rights Act of 1990 (the
"1990 Act")' 5 in reaction to a series of 1989 Supreme Court decisions impacting employment discrimination law is Although
encompassing many important issues, at the heart of the 1990
Act was its interpretation of the law of disparate impact, or unintentional discrimination, cases. A brief review of the history of
disparate impact interpretation follows, which will provide a
fuller understanding of the later discussion of the use of legislative history in interpreting the 1991 Act's standard of business
necessity
Title VII and DisparateImpact Discriminatin
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act broadly attacked employment discrimination." The law forcefully, and explicitly,
addressed employment practices that intentwnally discriminated
on the basis of race, national origin, sex, or religion.' Thus, Title VII clearly prohibited, for example, the exclusion of blacks
from certain jobs solely because of their race. The law's lan-

14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (Supp. III 1991).
15. The Senate passed S. 2104 on October 16, 1990. See 136 CONG. REC. S15,396
(daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990). The House passed H.R. 4000 on October 17, 1990. See id.
at H9994-95 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1990). President Bush vetoed S. 2104 on October 22,
1990. See VETO S. 2104: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, S.
Doc. No. 35, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990). The Senate was one vote short in its
attempt to override the veto. See 136 CONG. REC. S16,589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
16. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
17. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), amended by 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (Supp. III 1991).
18. For example, the Act states that
"lilt shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
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guage, however, was not as explicit with regard to employment
practices that disparately impacted mnnorities.
The disparate impact theory permits a plaintiff to recover
under Title VII even without showing that the employer intended to discriminate. With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Title VII establishes liability when a plaintiff shows that a
facially neutral employment practice more greatly affected members of one racial, gender, national origin, or religious class than
others. 9 Demonstrating this disproportionate effect establishes
the plaintiffs prima facie case.2" The employer can escape liability only if it affirmatively proves that the disparate impact
was "consistent with business necessity" 2 Prior to passage of
the 1991 Act, neither Title VII nor any federal statute explicitly
mentioned the theory of disparate impact liability Disparate
impact theory originated and became the law in the United
States
Supreme Court's 1971 decision of Griggs v. Duke Power
22
Co.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
Gnggs v. Duke Power Co. is the seminal disparate impact case
under Title VII. Commentators have described it as "[t]he single
most important Title VII decision, both for the development of
the law and in its impact on the daily lives of American workers."' In Griggs, black employees challenged the defendant's
use of educational requirements in determining eligibility for
promotion to certain unskilled jobs.24 The employees brought
suit under Title VII, claiming that such requirements violated
Title VII because their use resulted in the disqualification of a
significantly disproportionate number of blacks. 5
The Supreme Court held that the purpose of Title VII was to
proscribe "not only overt discrimination but also practices that

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. III 1991).
See td.
Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
H.R. REP. No. 644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19 (1990).
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-26.
Id.
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are fair in form, but discrnnnatory in operation." 26 "The touchstone," the Court continued, "is business necessity "27 The Court
held that once the plaintiff had shown the prima facie case of
disparate impact discrimination, a court could only uphold the
defendant-employer's questioned employment practice if business necessity justified such practices. 28 Thus, under Griggs,
valid employment practices must relate to job performance.2 9
The Court failed, however, to clarify the precise nature of that
relationship.
Business Necessity and the Griggs Definitin
The business necessity standard is concerned with the extent
to which employers legally may use employment practices that
disparately impact minorities. Viewed from another perspective,
the business necessity standard determines the point at which
the employer's legitimate interest in effective job performance
outweighs the State's interest in prohibiting disparate impact
discrnmnation. As the Court stated in Griggs, "[Title VII] does
not command that any person be hired simply because he was
formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group.""0 Griggs, however, left the definition
of business necessity unclear.
Five different formulations of the required nexus between the
business practice and job performance can be found in Gnggs.
The formulations are as follows:
(1) "standard is shown to be significantly related to successful
31
job performance;"
is shown to bear a demonrequirement
(2) "neither
successful performance of the jobs for
strable relatinship
3 2to
used;"
was
it
which

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. "If
shown to
30. Id.

at 431.

an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id.
at 430-31.

31. Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
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(3) "[w]hat Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and
mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a
3
reasonable measure ofjob performance;""
(4) "if an employment practice
cannot be shown to be
related tojob performance, the practice is prohibited;"3 4 and
(5) "Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question."5
In Griggs, the Court found for the plaintiffs, holding that business necessity did not justify the defendant's educational and
test requirements and that such requirements must be "a reasonable measure of job performance" in order to satisfy the 1964
Civil Rights Act. 6 In subsequent cases, however, what became
known as the Gnggs definition of business necessity was best
articulated by the fourth formulation, "related to job performance," 7 and the fifth formulation, "[having] a manifest relationship to the employment in question." 8 For eighteen years,
in fact, federal courts and administrative agencies applied and
enforced Title VII in disparate impact claim by looking at
whether business necessity justified the identified employment
practice, or group of practices and, specifically, whether that
practice related to either job performance or the employment zn
questin.9

33. Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 436.
37. Id. at 431.
38. Id. at 432. The fourth and fifth formulations best represent the holding in
Griggs and have received the most acceptance in the federal courts. They are
straightforward declarations referring to employment practices and requirements in
general and, thus, are applicable beyond the facts specific to Griggs. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329
(1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) ("In Griggs
this Court unanimously held that Title VII forbids the use of employment tests that
are discriminatory in effect unless the employer meets 'the burden of showing that
any given requirement [has]
a manifest relationship to the employment in question.' ") (alteration in original) (citation omitted); EEOC v. Atlas Paper Box Co., 868
F.2d 1487, 1490 (6th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 328 (8th
Cir. 1986).
39. From 1972 to 1985, Griggs was cited a total of 49 times by the Supreme
Court and 618 times by federal appeals courts. Alfred W Buimrosen, The Legacy of
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Following Griggs, the courts placed the burden of proof regarding the business necessity standard on the employer.40
Typically, workers would create a prima facie case of disparate
impact discrimination by showing first that an employer had a
high percentage of nunority workers in lower skilled jobs and a
low percentage of such workers in higher skilled jobs, and second, that this disparity was caused, however unintentionally, by
some specific practice of the employer.4 When not able to identify a specific practice as the cause of the disparate impact,
courts allowed workers to argue that a group of practices, taken
as a whole, caused the disparate impact, even if none of the
practices, taken individually, were discriminatory 4 2 The burden
then shifted to the employer to show that the identified practice,
or more nebulous group of practices, was justified by a significant relation to successful job performance." Griggs dominated
the interpretation of Title VII disparate impact claims until
1989, when the Supreme Court overruled Griggs in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atono. 44
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v Atorno, plaintiffs had brought
suit under Title VII against their former employer, an Alaskan
salmon cannery, alleging both disparate treatment (intentional
discrimination) and disparate impact discrimination." The latter allegations focused on the defendant's use of a number of
subjective and objective employment criteria that prevented the
promotion of predominantly nonwhite, unskilled employees into
skilled positions held almost entirely by whites." Applying a

Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 11 n.53
(1987).
40. Teal, 457 U.S. at 446-47 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
41. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1974).
42. See, e.g., Powers v. Alabama Dep't of Educ., 854 F.2d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir.
1988).
43. Id.
44. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
45. Id. at 642.
46. Such practices included an English language requirement, failure to post noncannery job openings, and nepotism. Id. at 648.
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traditional post-Gnggs disparate impact analysis, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held for the plaintiffs.4 ' The Supreme
Court, though, reversed, thus dramatically altering eighteen
years of disparate impact theory 4 8
The Supreme Court held first that the plaintiff-worker must
identify the challenged employment practice specifically 4 9
Thus, workers no longer could employ the easier "group of practices" argument.50 Secondly, the Court said that, although "the
employer carries the burden of producing evidence of a business
justification for his employment practice," the burden of persuasion "remains with the disparate-impact plaintiff."5 ' Prior to
the Wards Cove decision, the employer carried both burdens.5 2
Finally, and most importantly for this discussion, the Court attacked the Griggs definition of business necessity, stating that
"the dispositwe issue is whether a challengedpractzce serves, in a
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer ,53
Griggs and Wards Cove: What's at Stake?
The Gnggs definition of business necessity can be summarized
as follows: an employment practice shown to impact disparately
a protected class can still be valid zf the employment practice is
related to job performance or has a manifest relationship to the
employment in questin.54 The Wards Cove position states that:
an employment practice that disparately impacts a protected
class is valid so long as the challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer "
The Wards Cove standard of business necessity is far more
deferential to employers than the Griggs standard. After Wards
Cove, a valid employment practice need not relate to job perfor-

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Atomo v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439, 450 (9th Cir. 1987).
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661.
Id. at 658.
See id. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 659.
Id. at 664-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
Id. (emphasis added).
See supra notes 23-44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.

1186

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1177

mance.5 6 Thus, an employment practice requiring a high school
diploma for all positions in a company, similar to the challenged
requirement in Griggs, could be invalid using the Griggs standard because having a high school diploma may in no way be
related to the performance of certain unskilled manually intensive jobs. Under Wards Cove, though, if one of an employers'
legitimate employment goals was to promote education in the
community it serves, the practice of requiring a high school
diploma for even unskilled positions could be valid, even if it
disparately impacted a protected class. Griggs addressed this
argument and found it wanting, stating that such a goal would
not justify disparate impact simply because it "generally would
improve the overall quality of the work force."" Conceivably,
using the Wards Cove standard of business necessity, the Court
in Grzggs would have reached a completely differently decision.
Wards Cove, then, is extremely important with regard to the
ability of minority employees to protect themselves in the
workplace, and civil rights advocates viewed the decision as a
significant defeat in the battle against employment discrmination. 8 Against this background, Congress attempted to overturn Wards Cove with a new civil rights bill in 1990."9

56. See Cass R. Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 405, 484 (1989). Discussing Wards Cove, Sunstein says "the Court held that
the defendant need not show that a challenged practice is ' "essential" or "indispensable" to the employer's business.' Instead, the question is 'whether a challenged
practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer.' " Id. (footnote omitted). Sunstein then argues that Wards Cove "altered Grzggs."
Id. at 484-85.
57. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
58. See Sunstem, supra note 56, at 485 ("Wards Cove will produce substantial
underenforcement of the law."); see also Kermit A. Welch, III, Note, The Changing
Disparate Impact Theory of Employment Discrimination, 34 HOW. L.J. 331 (1991)
(discussing the effect of Wards Cove on employment discrimination law).
59. See H.R. REP No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 23-32 (1991) (concluding
that Wards Cove was an improper reading of congressional intent regarding business
necessity).
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The Civil Rights Act of 1990
Congress' first attempt to overturn Wards Cove failed."0 President Bush could not come to an agreement with congressional
supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 on two main points:
the definition of business necessity and the specificity with
which disparate impact plaintiffs would have to identify the
discriminatory employment practice." In the face of the
President's veto of the 1990 bill, civil rights advocates vowed to
introduce new legislation as early as possible in 1991.2
The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Introductin
The new attempt at a civil rights bill, House Bill 1, was introduced in the House of Representatives on January 3, 1991.3
The bill proposed sweeping changes to existing law ' Most notably for this discussion, it proposed to overturn Wards Cove in
the area of business necessity
In its original form," House Bill 1 defined "required by business necessity" much more restrictively than did the Court in
Wards Cove. The bill stated that
(A) m the case of employment practices involving selecthe practice or group of practices must bear a stgtion,
nificant relationship to successful performance of the job; or
(B) in the case of employment practices that do not involve
selection, the practice or group of practices must bear a sig-

60. See supra text accompanying note 15.
61. Civil rights supporters favored a more lenient requirement that would allow
plaintiffs to claim that a group of practices worked together to cause the disparate
impact discrimination. Joan Biskupic, Failure to Enact the Civil Rights Bill Laid to
Political Miscalculation,48 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3611 (1990). This "group of practices" argument would be allowed when-the plaintiff was unable to identify a particular practice that directly caused the disparate impact. Id.
62. Id.
63. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., ist Sess. (1991).
64. 137 CONG. REC. 453 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1991)
65. Congress later amended House Bill 1. See znfra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
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nificant relationshzp to a signzficant objective of the employer 66

The bill's definition of business necessity was "meant to codify
the meaning of 'business necessity' as used in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. and to overrule the treatment of business necessity as
a defense in Wards Cove."6 7
The Bush Administration'sResponse
Not surprisingly, the Bush Administration attacked the bill on
several fronts. First, it questioned the need to overturn Wards
Cove. In prepared testimony before the House Education and
Labor Committee, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights
John Dunne argued that Wards Cove provided adequate protection for discrimination victims."5 Dunne counted thirty cases
decided since Wards Cove and noted that the "decisions have
divided fairly evenly between plaintiffs and defendants." 9
Dunne argued that Wards Cove did not bring an end to successful disparate impact claims, stating that the post-Wards Cove
cases "demonstrate[d] that legitimate disparate impact claims
can still be brought and won."'
The Administration, however, was concerned primarily with
House Bill l's definition of business necessity 71 Admimmstration
officials, as well as business leaders, contended that the standard articulated in the bill was unreasonable "and that employers would turn to hiring quotas to protect themselves from lawsuits. 7 2 The Administration attacked House Bill 1 as "an engine of litigation 7' and stated that they "[would] not accept a
66. H.R. 1, § 3(o)(1) (emphasis added).
67. Id. § 3(o)(3) (citations omitted).
68. Hearings on H.R. 1, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Before the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 544-46 (1991) (Memorandum for the
Attorney General by John R. Dunne).
69. Id. at 545.

70. Id.
71. See White House Civil Rights Bill Would Expand HarassmentAwards, But Reject Jury Option, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at A-4 (Mar. 5, 1991) [hereinafter
White House Bill].
72. Joan Biskupic, New Struggle Over Civil Rights Brings Shift in Strategy, 49
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP 366, 370 (1991).
73. Statement of Assistant Attorney General John Dunne Before House Judiciary
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bill that results in quotas or other unfair preferences."74 The
Adminstration's labeling of House Bill 1 as a quota bill was in
spite of language within the bill stating that quotas were not required. 5
Assistant Attorney General Dunne, nevertheless, did find
some common ground with the supporters of House Bill 1.
Dunne called for legislation overturning Patterson v. McLean
Credit UnZon 76 and Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. 77 and
recognized the need for legislation in the area of sexual harassment in the workplace.78
Finally, the Bush Admimstration introduced its own Civil
Rights Act as an alternative proposal in both the House7 9 and
the Senate.8" These bills, House Bill 1375 and Senate Bill 611,
were introduced on March 12, 1991.81
The Bush Adminstratzon's Civil Rights Proposal (House Bill
1375/Senate Bill 611)
The Administration's proposal differed from House Bill 1 in
several respects, most notably in the definition of business necessity" "The term justified by business necessity' means that
the challenged practice has a manzfest relatinship to the employment in question or that the respondent's legitimate employment goals are significantly served by, even if they do not require, the challenged practice."2
The Administration's proposal was a strong challenge to
House Bill 1 and actually represented a retreat from some of the
compromises Bush agreed to in the 1990 negotiations. 3 Be-

Subcommittee on Civil Rights on Civil Rights Act of 1991 (HR 1), Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 27, at F-1 (Feb. 8, 1991) [hereinafter Dunne Statement].
74. Id.
75. See H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 13 (1991) (stating that nothing in the bill
requires or encourages quotas).
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

491 U.S. 164 (1989); see supra text accompanying note 5.
490 U.S. 900 (1989); see supra text accompanying note 5.
Dunne Statement, supra note 73, at F-1.
H.R. 1375, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
S. 611, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
See 137 CONG. REC. S3020, H1663 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1991).
H.R. 1375, § 3(n) (emphasis added); S. 611, § 3(n) (emphasis added).
For example, the 1991 proposal required employees to pinpoint which hiring
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cause the Democrats "started more to the left
[w]e started
more to the right," said a ranking House Republican.' John
Dunne called the Administration's proposal a "good-faith effort
toward negotiations." 5 Thus, by March, the initial lines were
drawn between the Bush Administration and congressional civil
rights advocates.8 6 Substantively, the two sides differed on the
definition of business necessity, the amount of specificity reqired in pleading, and the extent to which damages would be
expanded for victims of intentional discrimination.87 Politically,
however, the battle was over one issue-quotas.88
The Administration strongly attacked House Bill 1 as a quota
bill. 9 Attorney General Thornburgh said the Administration's
bill would encourage employers "to provide equal opportunity for
all workers without resorting to quotas or other unfair preferences." 0 In addition, Senator Robert Dole, the sponsor of Senate Bill 611, said House Bill 1 went beyond the standard elaborated in Gnggs and implied that it would "impose such a high
burden of proof on employers
that they would adopt quotas
in order to avoid the possibility of litigation."9 Such attacks
forced congressional leaders to adopt a strategy different from
that used in 1990 and attempt to "insulate
[House Bill 1]
from the quotas argument."92

practice caused the discrimination. Joan Biskupic, Bush Bill Moves to Right, 49
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP 683 (1991). This position represented a departure from 1990
when Bush was willing, in certain situations, to allow workers to challenge discrnunation caused by a group of practices. See id.
84. Id. (quoting Republican Rep. Bill Goodling of Pennsylvania).
85. Id.
86. See generally id. (describing developments in the debate over the proposed civil
rights bills).
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See Dunne Statement, supra note 73.
90. White House Bill, supra note 71, at A-4 (citing a letter that Thornburgh sent
to congressional leaders accompanying the Administration's bill).
91. Employment Quotas Again Placed at Issue as Republicans Introduce Civil
Rights Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at A-6 (Mar. 13, 1991).
92. Biskupic, supra note 72, at 367. See generally id. at 366-73 (discussing congressional reaction to the Administration's position).
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Negotiatins and Counterproposals
The Adnnmstration's charges that House Bill 1 was a quota
bill proved difficult for bill supporters to shake. 3 "There is no
question that in our vote counts and our meetings with members
[of Congress], the overwhelming concern has been the quota
issue, much more politically than substantively," lamented one
civil rights leader.9 4 One member of Congress likened attempts
to successfully counter the Adnnmstration's quota charge to
trying to "unring a bell."95 Moderate congressional Democrats,
particularly those from the South, were highly susceptible to the
quota charges, and proponents of House Bill 1 feared many of
these moderates leaned towards voting against the bill.9 Although Democratic leaders had the votes to pass the bill, they
fell short of the necessary two-thirds majority needed to override
a veto.97 As they were unable to override the 1990 veto even
with most of the moderates in tow, such a defection would doom
any hope of sustaimng the passage of House Bill I in its current
form.
The Administration's strong position forced supporters of
House Bill 1 to react and compromise. In late May, congressional backers of House Bill 1 proposed an amended bill, moving
more towards the Administration's position on business necessity9 It would now define business necessity as "a significant
and manifest relationship to the requirements for effective job
performance."99 However, the bill kept the language stating
93. Joan Biskupic, Democrats Scramble for Cover Under GOP "Quota"Attacks, 49
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1378 (1991).
94. Id. (quoting Ralph G. Neas, director of the Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights).
95. Id. (quoting Democratic Rep. Jim Slattery of Kansas).
96. Id. at 1380.
97. Joan Biskupic, Bill Passes House, Not Muster; Next Chance Is in Senate, 49
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1498 (1991).
98. Other changes included a damage cap of $150,000 on punitive damages available to victims of nonracial discriminatory bias. Tlhs provision was much more in
line with President Bush's, although with some differences. The Bush proposal limited all bias awards to a maximum of $150,000. The amended bill limited punitive
damages to $150,000, or an amount equal to compensatory damages, whichever is
greater H.R. 1, § 106(b), as amended on June 5, 1991.
99. Id. § 101(o)(1) (emphasis added). The bill also allowed "requirements for effective job performance" to include factors such as attendance and punctuality. Id.
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that 0the
Act was intended to overrule the Wards Cove defim0
tion.
House Bill 1, as amended, passed the House of Representatives on June 5, 1991.1"1 Despite strong congressional support

for a business necessity standard that moved away from Wards
Cove and back towards Griggs, the vote, 273-158, was fifteen
votes short of a veto-proof majority 102
The Administration Response to Amended House Bill 1
Even before the House vote, Administration officials blasted
the amended House Bill 1 as unacceptable and worked to weaken support of the bill. Attorney General Thornburgh said,
"[n]othing has changed. The president will veto any legislation
which has undergone only cosmetic changes and which still
forces quotas."' °3 President Bush further attacked the revised
bill, stating that "[elven the section that supposedly outlaws
quotas endorses quotas" and that House Bill 1 was not the road
to racial harmony, but the "road to lawsuits and discord."' °4
Following up his initial attack, Thornburgh labeled House Bill 1
"a hoax" and said it
excludes from the definition of quotas the only lnd of quotas
that matter and gives safe harbor to quotas already in existence
[sic] The bill would permit an employer to use a
quota system in the hiring of others so long as they met mmimum standards. The new language therefore would protect
the very kind of quotas that employers would be pressured to
use in order to avoid the costly and tune-consuming litigation
that this bill would foster. 10 5
§ 101(p).
100. Id. § 101(o)(2). The amended bill also held onto the earlier version's language
that '[niothing in the amendments made by this Act shall be construed
to require, encourage, or permit an employer to adopt hiring or promotion quotas." Id. §
111 (emphasis added).
101. See Biskupic, supra note 97, at 1498.
102. Id.
103. See Biskupic, supra note 93, at 1378 (quoting the Attorney General).
104. Remarks at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy Commencement
Ceremony in Quantico, Virginia, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 689, 691-92 (May 30,
1991).
105. Three Versions of Civil Rights Reform Will Be Considered by House Next Week,
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President Bush continued the quota argument, touting his
proposals as "tak[ing] dead aim at those who discriminate unfairly" and "encourag[ing] people to work together, rather than
employing quotas.""'6 Bush also accused the House Bill 1 supporters of playing politics with the civil rights issue, citing earlier attempts to paint House Bill 1 as a women's issues bill
when his bill "would properly protect women's rights-everyone's
0 ' Finally, the President implied that civil rights advorights.""
cates were not interested in compromise with the White House,
but, instead, sought to draft a bill that they knew would be
vetoed and thereby use Bush's veto as political fodder.'
After the House passed House Bill 1, President Bush claimed
victory 109 The President promised to veto House Bill 1 if it
survived the Senate intact.1 By the summer of 1991, the
Adminstration's ability to veto House Bill 1 and withstand a
vote to override looked assured. If congressional civil rights supporters were to pass a bill in 1991, the political climate suggested that it would have to be more along the lines of the
President's proposal than House Bill 1. The congressional focus
now shifted to the Senate and settled into a war of words equally as contentious as that which preceded.
Summer Stalemate and the Senate's Attempts at Compromise
Senator John Danforth hoped to be the prime instrument for
compromise in the Senate as he sought to find a civil rights bill
to please Republican moderates and southern Democrats."'

Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 105, at A-5 (May 31, 1991).
106. Remarks to the National Federation of Independent Business, 27 WEEKLY
CoMP PRES. Doc. 707, 709 (June 10, 1991).
107. Id.
108. See zd. at 709-10.
109. See Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Civil Rights Legislation, 27
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 724, 724 (June 5, 1991) ("Although the President has
indicated that the Democratic leadership's civil rights bill passed by the House of
Representatives today is a quota bill that he intends to veto, we are gratified by the
number of votes in opposition to the legislation. The 273-158 vote indicates strong
support for sustaining a Presidential veto.").
110. Id.
111. See Biskupic, supra note 97.
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Danforth's initial proposal actually consisted of three bills."'

The first, Senate Bill 1207, addressed the Supreme Court's rulings other than Wards Cove." The second bill, Senate Bill
1208, reversed Wards Cove and defined "required by business
necessity" as "a manifest relationship to requirements for effective job performance.""' It also required workers to pinpoint
specific discriminatory practices."' The final bill, Senate Bill
1209, addressed the issue of money damages, calling for a tighter limit on damage awards than did House Bill 1.11
While Danforth's plan appealed to its target audience of moderate to conservative senators, it failed to win strong endorsement from the more liberal civil rights advocates."' Senator
Edward Kennedy said Danforth's proposal "[fell] short of providing the full protection against job discriination.""8 More significantly, Danforth's three bill proposal was the target of considerable comment from the Bush Administration. Initially, the
President did not attack Danforth's plan directly, stating only
that he had "reservations" about it."9 Bush preferred, instead,
to deflect questions about the Danforth plan and continue his
charges that the congressional supporters of House Bill 1 were
playing politics with civil rghts. 2 9 Danforth, for his part, ac-

112. S. 1207, 102d Cong., ist Sess. (1991); S. 1208, 102d Cong., ist Sess. (1991); S.
1209, 102d Cong., ist Sess. (1991).
113. S. 1207, § 2(b); see also Biskupic, supra note 97, at 1499.
114. S. 1208, §§ i(b)(1), 5(a)(o)(1).
115. Id. § 3(a)(i).
116. S. 1209, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Senate Bill 1208 would not extend pumtive damages to groups not already covered by Title VII, e.g., women. See Biskupic,
supra note 97, at 1502. Danforth's bill allowed new compensatory damage awards m
intentional bias cases, such that employers with fewer than 100 employees could be
liable up to $50,000 and employers with more than 100 employees could be liable up
to $150,000. Id.
117. See Biskupic, supra note 97, at 1502.
118. Id.
119. Exchange with Reporters, 27 WEEKLY COMP PRES. DOC. 814, 815 (June 19,
1991).
120. See, e.g., id. ("I, frankly, resent it when some of my opponents [in Congress]
charge
me as having some kind of a political agenda here."); Exchange with Reporters, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DOC. 782, 782 (June 14, 1991)
("T]he politics are such that the Democrat leadership simply won't accept our
bill
"); Exchange with Reporters, 27 WEEKLY COMP PRES. DOC. 728, 729 (June
6, 1991) ("I must say I really still honestly feel that [the politics] are on the other
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tively sought the President's approval, stating that "[wie are
doing everything we can do to make it easy for the adimmstra-

tion to support this." 2 '
If President Bush was restrained in his comments about

Danforth's plan, other Admimstration officials were not. EEOC
Chairman Evan Kemp, Jr. argued that, under Danforth's definition of business necessity, employers would "have little choice
but to revert to [quotas]."22 Attorney General Thornburgh also
had harsh words for Danforth's proposal. Thornburgh argued
that the only appropriate standard of business necessity was
"manifest relationship to the employment in

question," the

Admimstration's language in Senate Bill 611/House Bill 1375
and the language of Wards Cove." As Thornburgh pointed
out, this standard was first articulated in Gnggs, which the
House Bill 1 proponents were seeking to restore. 4

side.").
121. Joan Biskupic, Danforth Revises Legislation in Quest for a Compromise, 49
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1669 (1991) (quoting Sen. Danforth).
122. Administration Officials Target Moderate Republican Civil Rights Bill, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 124, at A-15 (June 27, 1991).
123. See Text of Letter from Attorney General Thornburgh to Sen. Danforth, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 124, at E-1 (June 27, 1991) [hereinafter Thornburgh Letter].
124. Id. As noted earlier, one could find several different standards within Griggs.
See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. The Attorney General argued that
language other than the "manifest relationship" position used in the Griggs opinion
was confined solely to the facts of Griggs:
[Griggs], and the arguments generated by those facts,
The facts of
naturally led the Court to focus on the question of whether the employment practices at issue predicted job performance.
It is equally unsurpnsmg, however, that the Court has never
thought or said that every disparate impact case should be shoehorned
into a narrow analytical framework dictated by the particular facts at
issue m Griggs. That is why the Court has always relied on the more
general language of Griggs--"manifest relationship to the employment in
question"-when stating the legal standard established by Griggs.
Thornburgh Letter, supra note 123.
Thornburgh's last argument, however, is not correct. Although several of the
cases following Griggs do rely on the language to which he points, other Supreme
Court cases apply different language from Griggs. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The Court in Albemarle stated that "discriminatory
to be 'predictive of or significantly corretests are impermissible unless shown
lated with important elements of work behavior which compromise or are relevant to
the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated.' " Id at 431. This language
is similar to the "related to job performance" standard of Griggs. See also Merrick
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Thornburgh argued that "an unbroken line of Supreme Court
opimons overwhelmingly confirm[ed]" the Adimmstration's position. 2 ' The Bush Administration's business necessity standard,
Thornburgh implied, was preserving twenty years of Supreme
Court precedent since Griggs.
Senator Danforth made a second attempt to reach a compromise, introducing three new bills in June.126 Again, however,
Danforth drew scant attention from either Senate Democrats or
the Bush Administration. Although the issue of race was clearly
at the forefront of the nation, by mid-Summer, the focus was on
the nomnnation of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, not
civil rights in employment. Although the Thomas nomination
initially stole attention from the civil rights act, Judge Thomas'
hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee eventually
played a pivotal role in the final shaping of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991.12'
Continued efforts to reach a compromise stalled in the Summer of 1991 and the Senate took no substantive action."2
Thus, heading into September, both the Bush Adnnmstration's
business necessity position, "manifest relationship to employment in question," and its opposition to House Bill 1 continued
to appear strong.12 9 The Administration effectively had tagged
the congressional Democrats' proposal, "significant and manifest
relationship to the requirements for effective job performance,"
as that of a quota bill, a label that doomed House Bill 1 to a
sustainable veto.' 0 Attempts to find a compromise between the

Rossem, Disparate Impact Theory After the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Restoring the
Job Performance Standard, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: ITS IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 155, 166 (PLI Litig. & Adrmn. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 429, 1991) ("In all the Supreme Court decisions, except for Wards Cove
and Watson, and in virtually every lower court decision prior to Wards Cove, the
standard applied was whether the employment practice
was appropriately related to job performance.").
125. Thornburgh Letter, supra note 123.
126. S. 1407, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 1408, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S.
1409, 102d Cong., ist Sess. (1991); see also Biskupic, supra note 121.
127. See tnfra notes 138-54 and accompanying text.
128. See Joan Biskupic, Civil Rights: No Deal, 49 CONG. Q. WELY. REP. 2170
(1991).
129. Id.
130. Id., see also Biskupic, supra note 97.
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Bush Administration and Democratic civil rights advocates,
most notably the Danforth proposals, failed to earn substantial
support from either side of the issue.'31 One civil rights advocate argued that with the deck apparently stacked in its favor,
the Bush Admmstration did not want a civil rights bill at
all.3 2 This argument seems plausible as the Admimstration's
proposal basically codified existing Supreme Court interpretation of the two primary issues: business necessity and specificity
Thus, even if Congress failed to pass a civil rights bill, the
President's view, and that of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove,
would prevail. The only way the President could come out a
loser was if House Bill 1, or some similar bill, received a vetoproof majority After eight months of fighting over the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, the possibility of such a majority appeared
highly unlikely
Anita Hill, David Duke, and Compromise

In September 1991, Danforth tried yet again to fashion a
compromise agreement in the form of Senate Bill 1745. Similar
in nature to his previous efforts, his new proposal did offer a
different business necessity standard:
(1) in the case of employment practices that are used as qualifications standards,employment tests, or other selection crite-

ria,the challenged practice must bear a manifest relationship
to the employment m question; an[d]
(2) in the case of employment practices not described in para-

graph (1), the challenged practice must bear a manifest relationship
to a legitimate business objective of the employ1
er.

Danforth's new definition attempted to merge the Bush
Administration's position, "manifest relationship to the employ-

131. See supra notes 111-28 and accompanying text.
132. Civil Rights Advocates Criticize Administration's Role in Bias Bill Debate, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 158, at A-3 (Aug. 15, 1991) (statement of David Rose).
133. EEOC Chairman Criticizes Danforth Proposal to Link Language of Civil
Rights, ADA Act, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 185, at A-12 (Sept. 24, 1991) (emphasis
added) (quoting the draft version of Senate Bill 1745) [hereinafter EEOC Chairman
Criticizes].
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ment in question," with language from the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)3 4 and incorporate this new definition into
the Civil Rights Act. 5 Danforth thought that because the
ADA was acceptable to the President and Congress, use of its
wording might help to win bipartisan support for his new
bill. 13 The Bush Administration, however, still did not find
Danforth's latest attempt agreeable and threatened to veto the
137

bill in its current form.

Senate Democrats, meanwhile, grasped at Senate Bill 1745 as
a last chance to pass a civil rights bill in 1991." In doing so,
they were, in effect, led by a moderate Republican against the
White House.'39 Significant to the President, this same moderate Republican was the prime sponsor of Clarence Thomas' nomination to the Supreme Court. 4 ' If Danforth could attract other moderate Republicans to his position, three factors would
greatly weaken the Adminstration's position. First, the support
of moderate Republicans would help to soothe business leaders
who feared that Senate Bill 1745 would lead to quotas.' 4' Sec-

134. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. III 1991).

135. See Danforth Introduces Civil Rights Bill; Says It Has Good Chance to Override Veto, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 186, at A-17 (Sept. 25, 1991) [hereinafter
Danforth Introduces Bill]. The language borrowed from the ADA was "qualification
standards, employment tests, or other selection criteria." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6)
(Supp. III 1991).
136. "This past Labor Day
Chairman of the EEOC Evan Kemp said of the
ADA
'[Tihe ADA does not require, encourage or permit preferences or quotas for
those with disabilities
Proponents of civil rights bills of the future should look
to the ADA.' " Danforth Introduces Bill, supra note 135, at A-17 (quoting Sen. John
Danforth).
137. See EEOC Chairman Criticizes, supra note 133, at A-12.
Chairman Evan J. Kemp of the EEOC maintained in a Sept. 22
press release that the issues of discrimination affecting disability are
fundamentally unlike those addressed under Title VII-race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. He accused Danforth of taking "a few
words out of their context from the ADA and pretending that this
amounts to 'incorporating' ADA standards into Title VII."
Id.
138. See Joan Biskupic, Senate Passes Sweeping Measure to Overturn Court Rulings,
49 CONG.

Q.

WKLY. REP 3200 (1991).

139. See id. at 3202-03.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 3202 (noting the influence of Republican "swing" Senators in forcing
the Bush Administration to compromise).
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ond, only ten Republican senators were needed to provide a vetoproof majority in the Senate." Finally, the President would
Senate
need Danforth's strong support and influence with his
43
colleagues if the Thomas nomination ran into trouble.
The Administration's worst fears were realized with the explosion of Anita Hill's allegations against Judge Thomas.' That
Professor Hill charged Thomas with sexual harassment in the
workplace only compounded the Adrmmstration's problems with
respect to the pending civil rights legislation. 4 5
Administration officials kept a brave face and continued to
renounce Senate Bill 1745.146 Privately, however, President
Bush was locked in negotiations over the bill with Senate Republicans. 4 7 The bitterness of the year-long debate had some
Republican senators worried about the perception that their
The storm over sex and race of
party opposed civil rights.
the Thomas-Hill confrontation further compounded these
fears. 1 49 This storm, particularly with respect to sexual discrimination, gave no indication of dying down if the Senate confirmed Thomas. Senators accused of insensitivity to womens'
rights were reluctant to vote against a civil rights bill that extended employment discrimination protections for women. 50
Republican Senators Warner and Stevens, for example, told the

142. Biskupic, supra note 97, at 1499.
143. See Biskupic, supra note 138, at 3202-03.
144. Id. at 3200-01.
145. See id. at 3200 (noting that a "confluence of events in October intensified
racial and gender politics and shifted the political atmosphere").
146. As late as October 23, the Administration attacked the bill as "suffer[ing] from
essentially the same major problems as H.R. 1" and the vetoed 1990 Civil Rights
Act. Statement of Administration Policy on S 1745, October 23, 1991, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 206, at F-1 (Oct. 24, 1991). The Office of Management and Budget characterzed the bill as a quota bill and said the Administration's proposal would
achieve the "legitimate" goals of Senate Bill 1745 without resorting to quotas. Id. In
addition, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater denied that Danforth's role in
helping to confirm Thomas would sway the Administration to view Senate Bill 1745
any more favorably. Senate Debate on Civil Rights Is Likely to Begin Next Week,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 201, at A-1 (Oct. 17, 1991).
147. Fessler et al., supra note 4, at 3124.
148. See id. at 3124-26.
149. Id.
150. Biskupic, supra note 138, at 3201.
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President on October 23, 1991 that they would support Senate
Bill 1745.151
Republicans were also concerned how their civil rights record
would be perceived in the wake of former Ku Klux Klan leader
David Duke's political success as a Republican candidate for governor of Louisiana.152 Cofigressmen on both sides of the debate
viewed Duke's emergence as a viable Republican, coupled with
the furor over the Thomas confirmation, as significant factors in
dulling the effectiveness of Bush's "quota-bill" charges. 5 ' With
Republican senators pressuring the White House, the President
and Congress agreed to compromise and support an amended
Senate Bill 1745.5
Provisins of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Bush Administration announced its support for an
amended Senate Bill 1745 on October 25, 1991.15 The bill,
which the President later signed as the Civil Rights Act of
1991,156 did, in fact, represent a compronise of sorts.15 ' On
the issue of specificity, the Act requires a complainant to demonstrate the specific practice or practices that caused the disparate
impact. 5 ' The Act does provide an exception that if the worker
"can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a [company's]
decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice."' 59
As to business necessity, however, almost two years of arguing
and negotiating yielded no clear-cut definition. The Act states
that the plaintiff establishes an unlawful employment practice

151. Fessler et al., supra note 4, at 3124.
152. See id. at 3126; see also Devroy, supra note 13; Raspberry, supra note 13.
153. Fessler et al., supra note 4, at 3126.
154. Id. at 3124.
155. Id.
156. See Statement on Sigmng the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27 WEEKLY COMP
PRES. Doc. 1701, 1701 (Nov. 21, 1991).
157. See Joan Biskupic, Overturning Precedents, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3125 (Oct.
26, 1991).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. III 1991).

159. Id.
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if, after the plaintiff demonstrates that the particular practice
has a disparate impact, "the respondent fails to demonstrate
that the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity ""' Section
105(b) of the Act contains the most instructive statement of how
to define "business necessity" under the Act, yet it merely states
that
[n]o statements other than the interpretive memorandum
appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily
ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legislative history of, or
relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or
applying, any provision of this Act that relates to Wards
Cove-Busmess necessity/cumulation/alternative business
practice.' 1
The interpretive memorandum itself states that "[tihe terms
'business necessity' and 'job related' are intended to reflect the
concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to
Power
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio."' Yet, how should one interpret the interpretive memorandum? This treatment of the
business necessity issue created a tremendous amount of confusion, as did the initial position both sides derived from the multiple formulations in the Griggs opimon. 3 Griggs itself is not
very clear as to the business necessity standard."6 As such,
both the Bush Adimmstration and civil rights advocates claimed
victory in Senate Bill 1745.
Others, however, weren't so sure their side won. Conservatives were particularly concerned that President Bush betrayed
their cause.' 5 One Republican senator thought the bill would

160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. III 1991) (emphasis added).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (Supp. III 1991) (Legislative History for 1991
Amendment).
162. 137 CONG. REC. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).
163. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 4 (stating that "some conservative activists said
the administration sold out on the quota issue" and quoting Clint Bolick, vice president of the Institute for Justice, who claimed that the Act was a "capitulation to the
civil rights groups" and was "so confusing and rigs the rules against employers so
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still force employers to adopt quotas, and said he was disappointed with the outcome.' 6 Another senator had even harsher
words for the Administration:
It's hard for me to understand how changing a couple of
words and modifying a couple of definitions can totally reverse a policy that the Republicans and the White House
have had for more than two years
Anything that's acceptable
to
Ted
Kennedy
is
going
to
be
a hard sell i Indi6
ana.' 7
Stung by such criticism, the President denied that the new
bill would cause quotas and denied any flip-flop on his part. l"'
"We didn't cave. We worked out in a spirit of compromise a negotiated settlement where I can say to the American people, this
is not a quota bill."16 9 The President did concede that the final
bill represented a compromise and that the Administration did
have to give in from its position of the previous nine months.'7
"We didn't have the votes to carry my civil rights bill. So, have
we compromised some? Yes."'' Finally, President Bush argued
that he did have the votes to sustain a veto, therefore the threat
of an overriding vote did not force his agreement to the bill.' 2
White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray also went on the offensive, arguing that the Administration obtained the concessions it
wanted from the bill:
We are very, very satisfied
that businesses will not be
pressured into using quotas because of re-definitions that had
been proposed in other legislation, re-definitions of business
necessity, and, in addition, changes in the way cases are
brought, so-called cumulation or group of practices
Those changes are also eliminated from this compromise. So
73
we don't think the quota pressure is there."
strongly it will unquestionably encourage quotas").
166. Fessler et al., supra note 4, at 3126 (quoting Sen. Robert Smith).
167. Id. (quoting Sen. Robert Coats) (omission in original).
168. President's News Conference, 27 WEEKLY COMP PREs. Doc. 1503, 1505 (Oct.
25, 1991).
169. Id.

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. White House Announces Civil Rights Compromise Ending Two-Year Long Dis-
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With both sides in agreement on the bill, Senate Bill 1745 easily
passed the Senate and House. Finally, on November 21, 1991,
President Bush signed the bill, ending the bitter two year struggle for new civil rights legislation.'
One final bit of legislative history is important. Prior to the
President's signing of the Act, White House Counsel Gray drafted a signing statement that would order federal agencies to
When
terminate virtually all affirmative action programs.'
news of the statement reached civil rights advocates, they exploded and accused Bush of doubletalk-saying he supported
civil rights and the Act, while issuing executive orders ending
civil rights programs such as affirmative action." 6 President
Bush quickly disavowed any intention of issuing the draft signing statement and called it just that, a draft.' The President,
however, did put his own spin on the Act; in his official signing
statement, he instructed that an interpretation of the Act, submitted by Senator Dole during Senate debate, was to serve "as
authoritative interpretive guidance by all officials in the executive branch with respect to the law of disparate impact as well
as the other matters covered in the documents."' The sectionby-section analysis of the Act that President Bush referred to
stated that "the bill is no longer designed to overrule the meanInstead, the bill
ing of business necessity in Wards Cove
seeks to codify the meaning of 'business necessity' in Griggs and
other pre-Wards Cove cases."'7 9 Through this statement, the
pute, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 208, at A-11 (Oct. 28, 1991).
174. President Signs Omnibus Civil Rights Bill, Backs Away from ControversialInterpretation, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 226, at A-12 (Nov. 22, 1991) [hereinafter
President Signs Bill].
175. See ALI-ABA VIDEO LAW REVIEW, THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT Op 1991, at 315
(1992); see also President Signs Bill, supra note 174.
176. See, e.g., PresidentSigns Bill, supra note 174.
177. Controversial Civil Rights Directive Short-Lived in Wake of Firestorm of
Criticism, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 226, at A-14 (Nov. 22, 1991).
178. President's Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27 WEEKLY
COuP. PRES. DOC. 1701, 1702 (Nov. 21, 1991). "These highly technical matters are
addressed in detail in the analyses of S. 1745 introduced by Senator Dole on behalf
of himself and several other Senators and of the Admimstration. These documents
will be treated as authoritative interpretive guidance by all officials in the executive
" Id. (citations omitted).
branch
179. 137 CONG. REc. S15,475 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Robert

1204

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1177

President hoped to influence the final interpretation of the Act
and establish a business necessity standard consistent with his
long standing opposition to quotas. The President's signing
statement directly influences the application of the Act with
respect to executive branch agencies.5
After a two year political battle, the Civil Rights Act of 1991
is now law Original proponents of the Act intended it to provide
guidance in areas that previous civil rights legislation did not
cover explicitly 181 Instead, the new law leaves practitioners
with no better understanding of what is an allowable business
practice and what is illegal. Worse still, following the Act's enactment, many observers concluded that the Act restores the
Gnggs standard of business necessity-whatever that standard
is 8 2 -and overturns Wards Cove.183 Such conclusions are premature and fail to comprehend disturbing recent trends in the
Supreme Court, trends that may reinforce the Wards Cove standard of business necessity

Dole).
180. The use of such signing statements to influence statutory interpretation is a
relatively new executive branch action which the Reagan Administration used extensively. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA-L. REV. 621,
632-33 (1990); see also Kamen, supra note 11. Kamen writes
The White House now gets involved in the process through something called "signing statements." White House spokesman Marlin
Fitzwater told reporters [on November 21, 19911 that such statements are
"traditionally" affixed to bills. The "tradition" actually began in the Reagan-Bush administration.
The signing statements are seen, especially by conservatives, as a
way to give the president the last, unchallenged word on what a law
means to the public and especially to the courts.
It remains to be seen whether such statements-which are a way to
make points that couldn't be made in the legislation-will make any
difference in the long run.
Id. at A-14.
181. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
183. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
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A RETURN TO THE GRIGGS BusINEss NECESSITY STANDARD IS
NOT CERTAIN

The debate surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is representative of many problems surrounding our three branch system of government. For a variety of reasons, the legislative
branch refuses, or lacks the ability, to craft laws that specifically
set out what it intends the laws to achieve. In large part, Congress relies upon the federal courts to determine its intent. This
reliance on, or deference to, the judiciary is understandable, if
not well founded, because most members of Congress and their
staffs assume that when confronted with ambiguous statutes,
the courts will turn to the legislative history to glean Congress'
intent.&I
The judiciary traditionally has used legislative history for
statutory interpretation with the approval of courts, legislatures,
and the scholarly community, although neither the Constitution
nor any other statutory source prescribes the use of legislative
history 185

The introduction and strong congressional support of both the
failed 1990 civil rights bill and the successful 1991 Act may
indicate a congressional recognition that something is not right
with the current application of this method of statutory
interpretation."'6 One response to this suggestion is that the

184. "[Llegislative history
is available to courts because Congress has made
these documents available to us
[I]t has acquiesced in, and often affin-matively
promoted our use of [legislative history]." Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling SleeperThe Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the
United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 306 (1990).
185. See generally Eskridge, supra note 180, at 626-40 (discussing legislative history); Burt Neuborne, Background Norms for Federal Statutory Interpretation, 22
CoNN. L. REv. 721, 723 (1990) (describing the approach of the federal courts in
statutory interpretation to determine the "legislative intent" or "legislative purpose");
Wald, supra note 184, at 280 (stating that American courts have used legislative
history for over a century); id. at 286-300 (discussing the Supreme Court's use of
legislative history during the 1988-89 term). On the other hand, Professor Sunstem
states that focusing on the legislative purpose of ambiguous statutes was "especially
popular" in the 1950's and 60's. Sunstem, supra note 56, at 426. He implies that,
although still popular, this method of statutory interpretation is losing favor. Id.
186. Indeed, the very purpose of the 1991 Act was to respond to recent Supreme
Court decisions. See supra notes 5, 12 and accompanying text. Thus, a majority of
Congress must have felt that the Court was not interpreting its intent properly.
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Court, in many instances, no longer relies extensively on the
legislative intent model, yet Congress has been slow to realize
the Court's change in direction."' In fact, the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 is only one manifestation of congressional dissatisfaction
with the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of civil rights
statutes in recent years. Over the past dozen years, Congress
has enacted several statutes overruling Supreme Court decisions
in the civil rights field.' 8
Why does the Supreme Court repeatedly arrive at statutory
constructions that appear to run counter to the will and intent
of Congress? Or, viewing the issue from the other side, why does
Congress repeatedly force the Supreme Court to interpret vague
statutes, nsking the chance that the Court will arrive at statutory constructions that are counter to Congress' intentions? One
answer lies in the Court's increasing attraction to the
"textualist" approach of statutory construction and the inability
of Congress to understand what exactly the Court is doing when
it employs this method.' The Court's use of the textualist approach is at odds with the legislative intent model that 'most
members of Congress suppose the Court uses to interpret ambiguous statutes.19 °
Additionally, the Court, when it looks outside the statutory
language for guidance, increasingly relies on non-legislative

187. See Joan Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow View in Seeking Congress' Will,
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP 913 (1990); see also Wald, supra note 184, at 310 (questioning
whether Congress will address the Supreme Court's use of textualism).
188. See, e.g., Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat.
978 (1990) (overruling Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 488 U.S. 907
(1988)); Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28
(overruling Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)); Handicapped Children's
Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (overruling Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984)); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97205, 96 Stat. 131 (overruling City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)).
189. See Biskupic, supra note 187, at 913 (quoting Rep. Robert W Kastenmeir,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and
the Administration of Justice) ("If the Supreme Court is developing a different point
of view on legislative intent and legislative history, we need to know about it."). See
generally Mark E. Herrmann, Note, Looking Down from the Hill: Factors Determining the Success of Congressional Efforts to Reverse Supreme Court Interpretations of
the Constitution, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 543 (1992) (discussing congressional responses to statutory interpretations of the Supreme Court).
190. See nfra note 237 and notes 241-76 and accompanying text.
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interpretations of legislation.' 9 ' In doing so, the Court primarily looks to the interpretation of the federal agency charged with
adnnmstering the legislation in question.'9 2 Such deference to
agency interpretation can lead to results counter to the legislative will, but more in line with the policy of the executive
branch. The interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 may
very well be such an instance.
The remainder of this Note examines the 1991 Civil Rights
Act's business necessity standard in light of the traditional legislative intent approach, the newer textualist approach, and the
Supreme Court's doctrine of deference to agency interpretation
in certain circumstances. Such an analysis is necessary because
the Act's business necessity standard-as articulated in section
105-is clearly ambiguous and will cause extreme confusion in
and
Such confusion already exists'
its application. 9
eventually will prompt review by the Supreme Court.'
What is truly startling about the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is
that so many observers confidently state that the Act overturns
Wards Cove, even while noting the Act's ambiguity 196 These

191. See infra notes 287-306 and accompanying text.
192. Id.
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (Supp. III 1991) (Legislative History for 1991
Amendment).
194. See, e.g., John P Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, The Civil Rights Act of
1991, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 3, 1992, at 3, 11; Steven A. Holmes, Lawyers Expect Ambiguities
in New Rights Law to Bring Years of Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1991, at A20;
Kamen, supra note 11; Sharon LaFramere, Civil Rights Act Focus Turns to Enforcement, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1991, at A19; Marcus, supra note 4; Robert Pear, With
Rights Act Comes Fight to Clarify Congress's Intent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at
Ai; Fred Strasser, Bush Changes Puzzle, NA'L L.J., Dec. 2, 1991, at 6.
195. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also Strasser, supra note 194.
Strasser quotes Stephen A. Bokat, Executive Vice President of the National Chamber
Litigation Center, who says in reference to the Civil Rights Act of 1991:
It presents a fascinating legal question: What's going to control? The
president seems to be saying the EEOC and the Justice Department are
bound by the Dole language, and yet private plaintiffs are not limited to
that. We have a Supreme Court that tends to read statutes literally, and
that may be what will happen here. But for now, the possibility for confusion is there, as well as the potential for a lot of expensive litigation.
Id.
196. See, e.g., Cook v. Billington, No. 82-0400, 1992 WL 276936, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug.
Con14, 1992) (holding that "with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
gress questioned the Wards Cove analysis and established a more lenient legal stan-
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observers see litigation of the business necessity standard as
inevitable but also see a return to Griggs, or to some standard
very similar to Griggs, as equally inevitable.'97 Regardless of
the desirability of such an outcome, is such a conclusion really
that obvious? A more extensive look at this issue reveals that
the Bush Administration may have been right after all: the
Wards Cove standard of business necessity is here to stay
The continuation of the Wards Cove business necessity standard would have an obvious, immediate, and significant impact
on the law of employment discrimination. More importantly, and
far less obvious, the continuation of Wards Cove would symbolize Congress' inability to understand the current Court's actions
and Congress' ineffectiveness, after two years of almost constant
debate, to assert itself in the face of the executive and judiciary
dard for disparate impact cases" and "defendant does not dispute that Congress
intended to nullify various recent Supreme Court interpretations of civil rights
law-including Wards Cove-when it enacted the 1991 Act"); Cota v. Tucson Police
Dep't, 783 F Supp. 458, 472 (D. Ariz. 1992) ("Because the higher Griggs burden, by
virtue of the 1991 Act, once again applies in federal disparate impact cases
');
Senator Bill Bradley et al., Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Jan. 20, 1992) (panel discussion), reprinted in 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 896 (1992). Senator Bradley stated that
"[t]he 1991 Civil Rights Act
returns things to status quo." Id. at 931. Another
panel participant, Neil Mullen, stated that "[tihe Wards Cove dilution of the business
necessity concept has been undone to a large degree." Id. at 913; see also Coleman
& Jordan, supra note 13 ("[Tlhe new bill reverses Wards Cove in every major respect and codifies a strong version of the disparate impact test
"); Marcus,
supra note 4 (quoting Kerry Scanlon of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc.) ("Now all practices must meet the job performance standard, which is
what we said from the beginning."); Leigh Anne G. Hodge, Comment, The Civil
Rights Act of 1991: A Legislative Response to the Supreme Court's Weakening of Civil
Rights Remedies in the Workplace, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 801, 818 (1992) (declaring that
"[t]he Civil Rights Act of 1991 restores both the proof burdens and the meamng of
business necessity as formulated by the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co."); cf
Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470, 475 (9th Cir. 1993) (in ruling on the
Act's retroactivity, recognizing that the Act serves as "Congress' expressed desire to
undo the effects of recent Supreme Court decisions, and to restore civil rights law to
its previous state"); Little v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. CIV.A.91-1205-B,
1992 WL 223758, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 12, 1992); Wolfenbarger v. Boeing Co., No. 921117-13, 1992 WL 321622, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 1, 1992. The same district court, in
reviewing the Act's effect on Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989),
used the same language in two opinions to note that the Civil Rights Act of 1991
was enacted in response to a series of Supreme Court opinions, including Wards
Cove, stating, "[Tihe Act legislatively overrules these cases." Wichita Coca-Cola, 1992
WL 223758, at *1; Wolfenbarger, 1992 WL 321622, at *1.
197. See supra note 196.
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branches. The answer to how such an interpretation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 is possible lies in a discussion of the Supreme
Court's current and future direction in the area of statutory
interpretation.
THE SUPREME COURT'S CHANGING VIEW OF STATUTORY

INTERPRETATION

Strong debate currently surrounds the proper method of statutory construction particularly of ambiguous statutes. 9 ' The
domnnant approach in the federal courts remains the model that
employs "legislative intent" or "legislative purpose.""' This approach, however, has come under increasing fire from proponents of a more restrictive view called textualism." ° The following discussion looks at these approaches to statutory interpretation in broad, general terms. In addition, the following
sections will discuss the Chevron doctnne 0' of deference to

198. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 59 (1988) (arguing that courts should use an
objectively reasonable person standard to interpret statutory language rather than
trying to determine what Congress intended); Eskridge, supra note 180, at 623 (describing the emergence of "new textualism," a method of statutory interpretation that
"posits that once the Court has ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration
of legislative history becomes irrelevant"); Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's
Observations, 1987 DUE L.J. 380 (arguing for a restrained use of legislative istory
for statutory interpretation that relies on legislative committee reports); Kenneth W
Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371 (criticizing the easily abused use of legislative history for statutory interpretation andarguing that courts rely strictly on the words of the statute); Sunstein, supra note
56 (criticizing traditional theories of statutory mterpetation as incomplete and providing a more thorough approach to interpretation); Laurence H. Tribe, Judicial
Interpretation of Statutes: Three Axioms, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 51, 51 (1988)
(suggesting three axioms by which to achieve an "objective, enacted meaning of a
legal text"); Wald, supra note 184 (recognizing the validity of textualism, but arguing
that legislative history, when discrimnately used, is a most valuable tool in statutory interpretation).
199. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 180, at 641 ("The traditional approach is in
trouble."); Sunstein, supra note 56, at 410 n.16 ("[Textualism] is currently enjoying a
renaissance in the courts."); see also supra note 196 and infra notes 236-90 and
accompanying text.
201. See discussion infra notes 291-306 and accompanying text. The Court first
espoused this doctrine in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
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agency statutory interpretation. The application of these methods to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 will then follow
The Legislatwe Intent Model
The legislative intent model remains the dominant approach
to statutory interpretation among the federal judiciary 202 This
approach advocates judicial examination of the legislature's
intent behind statutory language when a court cannot determine
what the legislation dictates from a literal reading of the statute." 3 Under this model, if the statutory language clearly
states the law, the judge does not need to interpret the law at
all.2 °4 Only when the language of the statute is unclear does a
judge employ the legislative intent model to interpret the statute. °5
This approach presumes a collective will, or intent, of the
legislature in drafting laws. As discussed below, the idea that an
entire legislative body, such as 435 members of the House of
Representatives, can have one collective will has been severely
criticized. 2°" Nevertheless, arguably a dominant intention of
the legislative body does exist while other, competing intentions
are also discernible.20 7 To determine this dominant collective
legislative intent, a judge will look most commonly at the law's

202. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
203. As Professor Sunstein states, "[tihe goal is
to see more particularly how
the enacting legislature would have resolved the question, or how it intended that
question to be resolved." Sunstein, supra note 56, at 429.
204. See generally Wald, supra note 184 (discussing the role and necessity of legislative history). Judge Wald states that, "text comes first, and if it is clearly dispositive, then the inquiry is at an end. Legislative history, therefore, still has an important role to play as long as statutory text is not entirely 'plain.' " Id. at 285. But cf.
Eskndge, supra note 180, at 621. Professor Eskridge states that "[tihe Supreme
Court's traditional resolution of [statutory interpretation questions] has been to consider virtually any contextual evidence, especially the statute's legislative history,
even when the statutory text has an apparent 'plain meaning.' " Id. (emphasis added).
205. See Wald, supra note 184, at 285.
206. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 180, at 642 (arguing that the "collective intent
of a legislature is only a construction of the interpreter").
207. Cf. Sunstem, supra note 56, at 428 ("In some cases, the [legislative] purpose
might be characterized in many ways, all of which are faithful to the original enactment. The act of characterization is therefore one of invention rather than discovery.")

1994]

BUSINESS NECESSITY STANDARD

1211

legislative history to determine, in a general sense, what the
legislature would have done had they been presented with the
specific instance now before that judge."'
What Constitutes Legislatwe History?
A court delving into a statute's history looks prinarily at the
publicly recorded statements and reports that the legislative
body made during consideration of the legislation." 9 In some
instances, courts may also look at legislative history with respect to the issue addressed by the statute.2 "0 Prior to the
1980's, the Supreme Court routinely interpreted civil rights legislation by reviewing both the history of the specific legislation
before the Court and Congress' general view of civil rights legislation.2 1 '
The statute itself, even when ambiguous with respect to the
matter before the court, often provides the best source of the
legislature's intent.212 Most legislation includes at least one
statement of purpose crafted in broad terms. For example, a

208. See id. at 429 ("For those who emphasize legislative intent, the legislative
history is a central object of concern.").
209. See Eskridge, supra note 180, at 626-40. Professor Eskridge lists the following
sources of legislative history, in order of influence: committee reports, sponsor statements, rejected proposals, floor and hearing colloquy, views of nonlegislator drafters,
legislative inaction, and subsequent legislative history. Id. at 636.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, §209, at 87-88 (1991)
("For more than a century, it has been a widely accepted principle of American law
that remedial statutes, such as civil rights law, are to be broadly construed."). Professor Sunstem argues in favor of this approach. "In the face of ambiguity, courts
should resolve interpretive doubts in favor of disadvantaged groups so as to ensure
that regulatory statutes are not defeated in the implementation process. This idea
has roots in existing law, though the basic principle has rarely been explicitly recognized." Sunstein, supra note 56, at 483.
212. See Sunstem, supra note 56, at 425. Professor Sunstem states that "an interpretation should be disfavored if it would make the disputed provision fit awkwardly
with another provision or produce internal redundancy or confusion. An interpretation that would make sense of the statute as a whole should be adopted." Id. As
Sunstein acknowledges, however, such a structural approach suffers from two
problems. First, it is "depend[ent] on an assumption that statutes are in fact internally consistent and coherent," a theory Sunstein finds questionable. Second, "[iln
many cases, an examination of [the statute's] structure will reveal ambiguities, silences, or delegations." Id. at 425-26.
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statement such as, "The purpose of this Act shall be to provide
" clearly
for stricter civil penalties in the enforcement of
provides a structural framework from which the court can begin
its examination of the statute. Even if the statute's language
does not adequately define what it means by stricter penalties,
the intention that any future penalties should be greater than
previous penalties is clearly the legislature's general intention.
For a court to define the ambiguous statute otherwise would be
ludicrous.2 13
After the statutory language itself, the most common sources
courts use in reviewing legislative history are committee and
subcommittee reports and debate transcripts.2 14 In federal legislation, Congress routinely produces reams of reports and hearings transcripts containing findings and recommendations (representing both majority and minority views) covering proposed
legislation down to the minutiae.2 15 Members of Congress vote
on approval of the committee and subcommittee reports, so that
these documents serve as a clear and definable expression of the
committee's collective intent."' In addition, the entire legislative body may vote on the committee reports, again approving
the reports as an expression of that body's collective will.1 '
Certainly, most legislation does not receive unanimous acceptance from all legislative members. Courts should view majority
votes, however, particularly overwhelming votes, as the intent of
213. The classic exception to this, of course, would be if the court found the
statute's requirements to be unconstitutional such as if the state's application of the
statute constituted cruel or unusual punishment.
214. Eskridge, supra note 180, at 637, 639.
215. See generally George A. Costello, Sources of Legislative History as Aids to
Statutory Construction, CONG. RES. SERVICE (Jan. 27, 1989) (providing an excellent
review of the sources of legislative history and how they are traditionally used by
the courts), reprinted in Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. (1990)
[hereinafter Statutory Interpretation]. Cf OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 53-57 (Jan. 5, 1989)
(discussing how legislative history is made, but arriving at a different conclusion
with regard to the effect of legislative history), reprinted in Statutory Interpretation,
supra.
216. See Eskridge, supra note 180, at 637.
217. See id.

1994]

BUSINESS NECESSITY STANDARD

1213

the entire body Acceptance of committee reports and eventual
passage of legislation does not identify a specific, narrowly defined legislative intent. Rather, these examples of legislative
history should provide a narrow range of possible legislative
intent.
Judicial use of the legislative intent model is the most appropriate method for interpreting ambiguous statutes for three
reasons. First, the use of legislative intent is a pragmatic way to
compensate for the difficulties of writing legislation specific
enough to meet every possible application of the statute. The
legislative intent model also provides the best method for interpreting and reviewing laws, which is the proper role of the judiciary Finally, use of legislative intent is necessary when a legislative vacuum exists.
The Necesszty of Examining Legzslatwe Intent in the
Adminstratwe State
Ideally, legislative bodies should write statutes that clearly
and plainly state the law In such an ideal setting, courts would
not need to interpret statutory language, but merely decide
which party correctly understood and applied the law
In a complex and ever-changing world, however, this ideal is
simply not possible.2 1 Legislators cannot foresee every possible
scenario or application of the statute. Unintentionally ambiguous statutes, or those written at a time when future events are
not foreseeable or imaginable, require a certain amount of flexibility from the judiciary21 9 Some may argue that if unforeseen

218. See Mikva, supra note 198, at 380. Discussing the modem day difficulty of
having Congress speak more plainly, Judge Mikva states that "w]e are not talking
about trying to get Congress to agree on something ummportant or noncontroversial,
like whether to declare Grandmother's Day. Instead, we are talking about the hard
issues, like the environment, econonc decisions and civil rights." Id.
219. Compared to a textualist approach, using legislative history provides a means
of statutory interpretation in the instance of changed or unforeseeable events. See
Sunstem, supra note 56, at 422-24. Sunstein argues that "[t]extualism becomes even
more problematic when time has affected the assumptions under wich the statute
was originally written. Changed circumstances may produce ambiguity or interpretive
doubt in the text where neither existed before," and "[a]n interpretive strategy that
relies exclusively on the ordinary meaning of words is precisely that-a strategy that
reflects a choice among competing possibilities-and it will sometimes produce irra-
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events do occur, the legislature merely has to enact new legislation to cover such occurrences. Such an approach, however, is
unacceptable. 2 0 Practicality requires that courts be flexible
and interpret the existing laws by trying to decide as the legislahave had they anticipated the issue now before the
ture would
21
2

court.

The Judiciary's Proper Role Demands Use of the Legislative
Intent Model
Judicial review is a function of the courts. Since Marbury v.
2 22 judicial review has been the norm and to abolish
Madison,
judicial review would wreak havoc on our constitutional system.
Generally, judicial review permits courts to scrutinize legislation
and interpret its meaning and applicability If courts are to
review and interpret legislation, some interpretive model is
necessary For reasons stated previously, the use of legislative
intent makes the most sense in aiding a court's efforts at statutory interpretation. 223 Further, under the separation of powers
doctrine, when the judiciary exercises its constitutional role in
reviewing and interpreting legislation, the legislative branch

tionality or injustice that the legislature did not intend. Textualism of this sort is
not incomplete but instead pernicious." Id. See generally id. at 493-97 (discussing
how changed circumstances or obsolescence impact statutory interpretation).
220. The burden and strain on the legislature to amend legislation constantly for
even the slightest unforeseen changes would be too great, particularly in a regulatory state such as ours. Additionally, waiting for the legislature to address the impact
of unforeseen events does not provide a just and fair solution for those who must go
before a court under those unforeseen events. How does the court react in such a
situation? Does it simply not act because no clearly applicable statute exists? Or
does the court apply the statute as it has always done before, thereby refusing to
admit the legitimacy of the unforeseen events.
221. Indeed, Professor Sunstein argues that the growing complexity of the government forced the courts to abandon the early narrow interpretation of regulatory statutes: "The demands of the modern administrative state ultimately made it impossible for courts to sustain a theory of interpretation rooted i nineteenth-century
common law." Sunstem, supra note 56, at 409.
222. 5 U.S. ( Cranch) 137 (1803).
223. There is some question as to whether legislative history enjoys a long use by
the judiciary. Justice Scalia argues no; that its use is "almost entirely a phenomenon
century-and in its extensive use a very recent phenomenon." Wisconsin
of tis
Public Intervenor v. Mortier, Ill S. Ct. 2476, 2490 (1991).
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clearly has the right to exercise its constitutional role and enact
legislation to reverse the judiciary's decision.2 24
Use of Legislative History Is Necessary When the Legislature
Fails,or Refuses, to Act
In the event of a legislative vacuum, that is, when the legislature either consciously refuses to act or fails to act in a clear
manner, the judiciary may need to step in and take some action.
In some instances, the efficient running of society demands that
courts play a stronger role in defining the nation's laws.2" In
doing so, courts should act as consistently as possible with legislative intent.22 To do so, a court must rely on legislative history to provide the necessary guidance. If a court, in attempting to
interpret ambiguous statutory language, did not look to some
collective legislative will, it would be unable to justify any conclusions it reached. The only logical place for the court to look is
to the intent of the legislatwe body; otherwise, the court's decision would be grounded in its own intent. 7 Clearly, however,
separation of powers dictates that an unelected judiciary should
not make new law on its own whim. 8 When a legislative

224. Such legislation would also more likely be very specific in its language. This is
not always true, however, as the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 illustrates.
See infra notes 310-52 and accompanying text.
225. The role of the courts in defining and enforcing civil rights in the 1950's is
such an example.
226. In such instances, as Sunstein notes, the court sees its role as that of an
agent of the legislature. He specifically describes judicial inquiry into the legislative
purpose as "an effort to maintain the role of the courts as agents of the legislature."
Sunstem, supra note 56, at 426.
227. See Sunstem, supra note 56, at 428. Professor Sunstem states that "in hard
cases, the meaning of the statute should be derived by ascertaining the intent of
those who enacted it." Id. He further states the pro-legislative intent argument that
"it is not clear where judges are to look if they refuse to consider the legislative
history." Id. at 430.
228. See Wald, supra note 184, at 281. Judge Wald finds that "[plersonal expenence has revealed that the nearly umversal view among federal judges is that when
we are called upon to interpret statutes, it is our primary responsibility, within
constitutional limits, to subordinate our wishes to the will of Congress because the
legislators' collective intention, however discerned, trumps the will of the court." Id.,
accord Sunstem, supra note 56, at 415 (noting that supporters of the traditional approach believe 'judges are agents or servants of the legislature").
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vacuum occurs, the courts should act, but only to the extent that
the elected, lawmaking body would act.229
The legislative intent model seeks to provide courts with a
practical framework for interpreting ambiguous legislation' °
For whatever reason a court reviews legislation, once the legislation is before a court, the court should attempt to settle the
issue rather than ignore it or wait for the legislature to act in a
more explicit manner.
Through the use of legislative history, a court may arrive at
an interpretation that, for the moment, most adequately reflects
the legislative body's intentions to date.23' A court's interpretation ultimately may be found not to reflect the current
legislature's intent.23 ' In that case, the legislature can make
use of its constitutional powers and enact new, more specific
legislation that reflects the current intent of the legislature and
clearly states that intent in unambiguous terms.2 33
The legislative intent approach does have its problems and
the textualist's critique of using legislative history presents
many valid arguments for the courts to consider. 2 4 Nevertheless, the use of legislative history, as compared to the textualist
approach, provides the best method of interpreting ambiguous
statutes for a number of theoretical reasons as noted above.
Additionally, the use of legislative history makes sense from a
policy perspective because Congress assumes, when writing new

Although many textualists would argue that egregious use of legislative history
constitutes judge-made law, others find the textualist methodology to be equally
capricious. See, e.g., Sunstem, supra note 56, at 416. Sunstem argues that the "central problem [with textualism] is that the meaning of words (whether 'plain' or not)
depends on both culture and context. Statutory terms are not self-defining, and
words have no meaning before or without interpretation." Id. Sunstem further notes
that "reliance on ordinary or dictionary definitions, without reference to context, will
sometimes lead to interpretive blunders." Id. at 417. Thus the need to look outside
the statutory language for guidance exists. Id.
229. See Wald, supra note 184.
230. See generally Eskridge, supra note 180, at 626-40 (discussing the Court's traditional use of legislative history); Wald, supra note 191, at 301-08 (companng the
legislative intent model with the textualist model).
231. Id.
232. See Sunstem, supra note 56, at 428-34.
233. Id.
234. See infra notes 250-85 and accompanying text.
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legislation, that the courts will pay attention to legislative history 235 The same cannot be said of textualism.

The Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretatzon
The textualist approach to statutory interpretation is, theoretically, much more restrictive in the amount of judicial creation
allowed. Although both textualists and supporters of the legislative intent model agree that the first step in statutory interpretation is reading the statute for its clear intent, the
textualists basically stop after this step. Simply put, textualism
argues that statutes "are what their literal text commands and
nothing else."236 Thus, when the clear meaning of a statute is
not evident from the literal text, textualism stands directly opposed to the legislative intent model. 7
Textualism currently does not enjoy a widespread following
among the federal judiciary " Nevertheless, a small but growing and influential group of textualists have made their presence
known, particularly at the highest levels of the judiciary239
Most notable among these adherents to textualism on the Supreme Court is Justice Antomn Scalia." The remainder of this
discussion of textualism focuses on Justice Scalia's version of the
textualist method and his view of how courts should treat ambiguous statutes.

235. See supra notes 184, 189 and accompanying text.
236. Neubore, supra note 185, at 722.
237. Judge Wald argues that "the textualist view logically points to a full-scale
attack on the use of [legislative history]." Wald, supra note 184, at 285. She acknowledges, however, that textualists, including Justice Scalia, "have not yet taken
it that far." Id.
238. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 185, at 722 n.5 (stating that Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge Frank Easterbrook is "the leading modem exponent of
[textualism]"); Wald, supra note 184, at 300 (stating that Justices Scalia and Kennedy are "true believers" in textualism and Justices Rehnqist and O'Connor occasionally have supported textualism).
240. See Wald, supra note 184, at 281.
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Attack on the Legislative Intent Model
Justice Scalia's brand of textualism conflicts directly with the
traditional legislative intent model.241 He places no faith in legislative history and does not believe it possible for a legislative
body to have a collective intent or collective will.4 2 In Scalia's
view, "judges owe deference only to language that a majority of
Congress has approved and the president [sic], by his signature,
has endorsed."243 Justice Scalia takes dead aim at the use of
common sources of legislative history for any purpose.' Justice White, commenting on Scalia's view, said "[hie has often
said that courts should not refer to legislative history at all
where the statutory text is clear enough."245 To Justice Scalia,
legislative history is not a legitimate measure of congressional
will. 4 ' For example, Scalia argues that obscure congressional
247
staff members have too great an effect on committee reports.

241. Professor Eskridge labels Scalia's view "the new textualism." Eskridge, supra
note 180, at 623. Eskridge summarizes Scalia's views as follows:
The new textualism posits that once the Court has ascertained a
statute's plain meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant. Legislative history should not even be consulted to confirm the
apparent meaning of a statutory text. Such confirmation comes, if any is
needed, from examination of the structure of the statute, interpretations
given similar statutory provisions, and canons of statutory construction.
Id. at 623-24.
242. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment); Hirschey v. F.E.R.C., 777 F.2d 1,7 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I frankly doubt that it is ever reasonable to assume that the details
set forth in a committee report come to the attention of,
much less are approved by, the house which enacts the committee's bill.").
243. Biskupic, supra note 187, at 915.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 917 (quoting Justice White's remarks at the ABA Annual Meeting in
August 1989).
246. 'Justice Scalia suggests that legislative history is frequently written by wellorganized private groups, and much of it, especially the floor debates, reflects little,
if any, general congressional will." Sunstein, supra note 56, at 429. However,
Sunstein disagrees with Scalia's conclusion, and, instead, argues that "[the legislative history will sometimes reveal what some or many members of the Congress
thought about the meaning of an ambiguous term, and that understanding is relevant. It is unlikely that the history will only reflect the views of self-interested prvate groups." Id. at 430.
247. 'As anyone familiar with modern-day drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware, the references to the cases were inserted, at best by a committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff
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The staff members, in fact, actually research and write the reports.2 4 In addition, very few legislators actually read and
comprehend the reports generated by their staff.2 49 Thus,
Scalia would argue, to make use of congressional reports that
most legislators understand in only a very general way, at best,
is extremely dangerous. How can words barely read by someone
reflect their intent on particular legislation?
Further, legislators who do understand the contents of committee reports often use the reports as a method of inserting
personal views that in no way represent the sentiment of the
entire Congress, or even a majority 210 Committee members often have a special interest in the committee topic and, arguably,
their interest and views do not reflect the view of Congress as a
whole.25 ' In addition, Congress often substantially amends legislation after the filing of committee reports.5 2 To consider
these reports as indicative of the intent of a majority of legislators, therefore, is highly questionable.5 3 Much of the same argument against the use of committee reports can be made
against judicial use of floor debates 2 4 and the Congressional

member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist." Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87,
98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
248. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 215, at 15, 56.

249. See id. at 56.
250. Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation,
62 U. COLO. L. REV. 37, 54-55 (1991).
251. Id. at 54.
252. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 exemplifies tis point. The Senate issued no
committee report. The House Committee on Education and Labor issued its report
on April 24, 1991, when House Bill 1 was still the leading bill before the House.
The final Act differed from House Bill 1 on several positions. No committee reports
were issued with respect to Senate Bill 1745, the bill that actually became the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
253. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia's concurrence in Green is typical of his
views on the matter:
I find no reason to believe that any more than a handful of the Members
of Congress who enacted [FRE] 609 were aware of its interesting evolution from the 1942 Model Code; or that any more than a handful of
them (if any) voted
on the basis of the [committee reports], or floor
debates-statements so marginally relevant, to such minute details, in
such relatively inconsequential legislation.
Id.
254. Id.
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Record."' The latter often includes statements that members
insert after Congress has voted on the legislation."' Such legislative "speeches" provide a perfect opportunity to inject selfserving statements into the record that courts should not view
as legislative intent.
Although textualist attacks on the use of legislative history
are numerous and well documented,25 ' textualists are often
vague on how courts should interpret ambiguous statutes without making use of legislative history Justice Scalia, however,
has a very clear idea of how textualism should resolve the judicial review of ambiguous statutes.
Aside from his dislike of the traditional sources of legislative
history, Scalia finds fault with the whole notion of the determination of a legislative intent through the judicial process. Simply
put, Scalia argues that courts should interpret ambiguous statutes only by looking at the actual statutory language, because it
is only this statutory language that all members of the legislature actually voted on with the intent that it become law 258
According to Judge Wald, Justice Scalia views "[t]he words of
[as] the only definitive source of congressional ina statute
9
tent."" "To accomplish this," Judge Wald continues, "judges
are to depend exclusively on their own knowledge, perhaps with
the aid of a dictionary, to determine the meaning of words in
statutes, supplementing 'ordinary usage' only by reference to the
context in which the words are found within the statutes themselves."26 0

The new textualist argunient, then, is that the use of legislative history is constztutionally suspect. 261 As Professor Sunstein
notes, the Scalia-textualists give credence to statutory language

255. Id. at 528-30.
256. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 215, at 54-55.
257. See, e.g., Green, 490 U.S. at 527-30 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment);
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment); United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1080 n.19 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Frank A. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 59 (1988).
258. Green, 490 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
259. Wald, supra note 184, at 282.
260. Id.
261. Greenberger, supra note 250, at 64.
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over legislative history because only "[sItatutory terms-not
legislative history, not legislative purpose, not legislative
'intent'-have gone through the constitutionally specified procedures for the enactment of law ,262
Justice Scalia is emphatic on this point. In Blanchard v.
263 the majority opimon, in part, based
Bergeron,
its interpretation of a federal statute2" on a Fifth Circuit opimon, Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,265 which the statute's House
and Senate reports cited approvingly26 6 The Court, therefore,
reasoned that Johnson "provid[ed] guidance to Congress' intent"
on the statutory issue before the Court. 7
Scalia, however, criticized the majority's reasomng and stated
that he "decline[d] to participate in this process."26 Although
concurring in the judgment, Scalia argued that whether Congress embraced Johnson or not was unclear.6 9 "Congress," he
wrote, "is elected to enact statutes rather than point to cases ),270
In a later case before the Court,2 7' Scalia clearly defined how
he believes courts should interpret ambiguous statutes:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to
have been understood by a larger handful of the Members of
Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1)
most in accord with context and ordinary usage
and (2)
most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which
the provision must be integrated-a compatibility which, by a
bemgn fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind.272
Justice Scalia's approach, however, is flawed. As Professor
Sunstein argues, the "central problem [with the textualist view]
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Sunstem, supra note 56, at 416.
489 U.S. 87 (1989).
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 91.
Id.
Id. at 99 (Scalia, J., concurring).

269. Id. at 98-99.
270. Id. at 99.

271. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
272. Id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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is that the meaning of words (whether 'plain' or not) depends on
both culture and context. Statutory terms are not self-defimng,
and words have no meaning before or without interpretation." ' Justice Scalia argues that statutory language can be
determined through the words "ordinary usage." 4 The result
of this approach seems to be that the words are interpreted as
he interprets their ordinary usage." In effect, Scalia merely
substitutes his own interpretation for that of the legislative
body 27 6 Scalia's ultimate reliance on his own interpretive powers is not the only possible criticism of his textualist approach.
Critzque of the Textualist Approach
Justice Scalia's textualist approach is subject to attack on
several fronts. Judge Patricia Wald of the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals is a strong opponent of textualism and is credited with
being one of the first judges to publicly take notice of the rise of
textualism within the federal judiciary2 7 Judge Wald argues
that strict use of textualism presents a serious separation of
powers problem:27 8
To disregard committee reports as indicators of congressional
understanding because we are suspicious that nefarious staffers have planted certain information for some undisclosed
reason, is to second-guess Congress' chosen form of orgamzation and delegation of authority, and to doubt its ability to
oversee its own constitutional functions effectively It comes
273. Sunstem, supra note 56, at 416.
274. Green, 490 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
275. Sunstem, supra note 56, at 416-17.
276. Sunstem notes that Scalia's goal might not be so obvious. Id. at 457. Rather
might be an effort not to discover what Congress
"[tihe 'plain meaning' principle
meant in the particular case, but instead to tell Congress to be careful with statutoThe hope-probably a false one-is that the principle will lead
ry language
Congress to express itself clearly in the future." Id. Professor Eskridge, who supports
Sunstem's point, observes that textualists, in general, argue that the legislative history model takes legislative power away from the legislative branch and that
textualism is necessary to fight the judicial encroachment into the legislative realm.
Eskndge, supra note 180, at 648.
277. See Wald, supra note 184 (noting and criticizing the rise of textualism on the
Supreme Court); see also Biskupic, supra note 187 (describing the rise of textualism
on the Supreme Court and the disfavorable reaction by Congress).
278. Wald, supra note 184, at 306-08.
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perilously close, in my view, to impugning the way a coordinate branch conducts its operations and, in that sense, runs

the risk of violating the spirit if not the letter of the separation of powers principle. 9
Textualism suffers generally in its attempt to interpret ambiguous statutes and thereby demonstrates the difference between
textualism and the traditional legislative intent model. Both
methods advocate adherence to the plain language of the statute
if discernible."' The two diverge with the next step. While
Judge Wald would look to extrinsic sources of legislative history,
analyze them, and arrive at an interpretation that she finds
consistent with the intent of the entire bill making process,
Justice Scalia and his fellow textualists look primarily at the
exact language of the bill itself and somehow ascertain the
statute's meaning, even when admitting the ambiguousness of
the language.2 ' The question even Justice Scalia seems to
have trouble answering is how a textualist can ascertain the
interpretation upon which they eventually decide.
Judge Wald notes two primary alternative sources to legislative history that textualists may use in interpreting ambiguous
statutes.28 2 First, they could use a "hyper-literal" reading of the
statute, which Wald attacks as ineffective and sure to "gut"
many statutes of their "intended" meaning. 283 Textualists also
may supply their own assumptions about how to interpret the
statutory language.2 Of course, no judge will admit to such a
method, but for a jurist, textualist or otherwise, not to bring
their own "assumptions, speculation, preferences, and notions of
'sound public policy' "into their decision would be nearly impossible.
With no extrinsic sources to fall back on and the

279. Id. at 306-07.
280. See supra notes 203, 226-28 and accompanying text.
281. Sunstem states that "[wihen the language of a statute does not specify its
implementing rules, textualism is incomplete: courts must look elsewhere." Sunstem,
supra note 56, at 422.
282. Wald, supra note 184, at 303-06.
283. Id. at 303.

284. Id. at 304.
285. Id.
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statute itself being ambiguous, the danger of such judicial subjectivity increases. 286
Finally, and most importantly for this discussion, textualism,
by virtue of its rejection of extrinsic legislative sources, runs the
very real possibility of favoring the executive branch and/or
independent agencies over the legislative branch on issues affecting a federal agency2 7 This problem would arise because
the Court, with no extrinsic evidence of legislative intent in
front of it, would look either to one of the two possibilities just
mentioned or to the existing interpretation used by the admmstrative agency in enforcing the statute. If the agency's interpretation is at issue, the Court is not necessarily presented with a
question of what the legislation intended, but rather with a
question of whether the agency's interpretation is permissible
given a literal reading of the ambiguous statute. In fact, Justice
Scalia has contended that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's interpretation of an ambiguous statute should
receive deference stating, "the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous language need only be reasonable to be entitled to defer' Absent such a conflict, one would have difficulty imagence."288
ining a situation in which a textualist Court would not give
deference to an agency interpretation because, again, the
textualist would not consider countervailing legislative history
that might weigh against that interpretation.
As Judge Wald notes, "if the clarity of Congress' will must be
discerned solely from the text, without access to legislative history, there will be fewer cases where judges can confidently determine that will. As a result, the executive will decide more

286. See id.
287. See id. at 308.
288. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1236-37 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (quoting EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 487
U.S. 107, 115 (1988)). The majority opinion stated that the amount of deference the
EEOC interpretation should receive was dependent on "the thoroughness evident m
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade" and held
that the EEOC's interpretation was incorrect. Id. at 1235 (quoting General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944)).

1994]

BUSINESS NECESSITY STANDARD

1225

cases under the Chevron principle."2 9 The Chevron principle
that Judge Wald alludes to, although not a textualist doctrine,
adds tremendous fuel to a textualist court wishing to give such
deference to an agency interpretation.2 ' This coupling of
textualism and Chevron has tremendous implication for judicial
review of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
The Importance of Chevron
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of an agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutes in Chevron v. NaturalResources
Defense Council.Y Chevron declared that courts, when unable
to discern a statute's literal meamng, should defer to a federal
agency's interpretation of a statute unless clear evidence suggested a contrary congressional intent:
When a court reviews an agency's cbnstruction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter
If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the
absence of an admimstrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.2
Chevron does not say that courts should defer automatically to
the agency interpretation. To be judicially acceptable, such an
interpretation must be a permissible construction of the statute. Specifically, a court must reject an agency interpretation
if it is "contrary to clear congressional intent."29 4 The Court in
289. Wald, supra note 184, at 308.
290. Id.
291. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
292. Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
293. Id at 843.
294. Id. at 843 n.9 ("The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory
construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent.").
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Chevron further noted that courts should give deference to a
permissible agency interpretation only when Congress is silent
on the matter29 and that courts must first determine legislative intent and then defer to the agency interpretation, only if
the legislative intent is not discernible.2 11 The Chevron procedure may be summarized as follows: (1) examine the statute to
apply the clear and unambiguous language; failing that, (2)
determine Congress' intent with respect to the precise issue at
hand and apply the statute accordingly; and failing that, (3)
examine the agency interpretation and determine if it is permissible.2 9 '
The doctrine set forth in Chevron seems a reasonable extension of the legislative intent model."' A court first must look

295. Id. at 842-43.
296. Id. at 843 n.9 ("If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.") (emphasis added).
297. See, e.g., id. at 859-63 (outlining the application of this procedure). The Court
was quick to point out that a permissible interpretation does not necessarily mean the
one Congress would have wanted. "The court need not conclude that the agency
construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the
construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially
had arisen in a judicial proceeding." Id. at 843 n.1i.
The Court in Chevron also quoted an earlier Supreme Court case as follows:
We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted
to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative
interpretations
has been consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as
to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling
conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the
statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more
than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency
regulations.
If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of
conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the
statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute
or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that
Congress would have sanctioned.
Id. at 844-45 (quoting United States v. Shinier, 367 U.S. 374, 382, 383 (1961))
(emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted).
298. But see Sunstem, supra note 56, at 445. "A rule of deference in the face of
ambiguity would be inconsistent with understandings, endorsed by Congress, of the
considerable risks posed by administrative discretion." Id. Sunstem further argues
that "[ain ambiguity is simply not a delegation of law-interpreting power. Chevron
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to legislative history for the legislative intent. If none is available or discernible, then the court defers to the agency After all,
the court must look somewhere for assistance in interpretation.
The Chevron doctrine in the hands of a textualist such as
Justice Scalia, however, drastically alters the formulation. For
Scalia and the new textualists, a search for congressional intent
is useless because legislative history is not an authoritative
source of what the law means. 9 Thus, when confronted with
an ambiguous statute, a textualist court could always bypass the
second step of searching for that legislative intent and defer to
the appropriate federal agency's statutory interpretation, assuming the agency's interpretation is permissible. A move towards
textualism makes the Court's decision in Chevron all the more
troubling in instances when agency interpretation and legislative intent collide.
The use of agency interpretation as a whole, particularly in
the hands of textualist jurists, presents a distinct problem because agencies typically do not engage in a "slavish search for
what Congress wanted.""0 Without such a search, the agency
conceivably could make new law on its own, with no consideration of the legislative branch.'
Significantly, the Court's textualists and non-textualists alike
employ the Chevron doctrine.0 2 One should not infer as such
that the Chevron doctrine is a subset of textualism. 30 3 Application of the Chevron doctrine by a textualist court, however, presents serious concerns, particularly with respect to the separation

confuses the two." Id.
299. Wald, supra note 184, at 285.
300. Neuborne, supra note 185, at 730.
301. Consider, for example, the possibilities involved when an executive agency
interprets ambiguous legislation enacted by Congress over a presidential veto.
302. The Chevron decision, authored by Justice Stevens, was unanimous, although
Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and O'Connor did not participate in the decision. Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984). The Justices
who joined in Justice Stevens' opinion included Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Brennan, White, Powell, and Blackmun. See id. at 839. Although Judge Wald lists
Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor as leaning towards textualism, see supra note 239,
Blackmun and Stevens are not part of the textualist camp.
303. See generally Sunstem, supra note 56 (reviewing different methods of statutory
interpretation, and discussing textualism and the Chevron doctrine as two separate
methods).
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of powers principle." 4 As Professor Sunstein states, "[t]he combination of textualism, disregard of legislative history, and the
would produce a dramatic increase in the
Chevron principle
executive's power to make law When the language is ambiguous, the executive's interpretation will control, even if the legislative history argues in the other direction. Consider in this
regard Justice Scalia's general enthusiasm [for textualism]. " 305
Most likely, when Justice Stevens crafted his Chevron opimon a
year before Justice Scalia ascended to the Court, he did not
consider the potential effects of Chevron in the hands of a
textualist powerhouse like Scalia.0 6
The above discussion does not delve deeply into the debate
over textualism and the legislative intent model,3 °7 nor is it an
in-depth review of the methods of statutory interpretation.0 3
For purposes of this Note, only an understanding that these two
competing methods exist and that they can lead quite obviously
to distinctly different results is important. Thus, courts can
interpret the same piece of legislation in two completely different ways, depending on which method the court employs. Such
an observation has significant implications with respect to the
business necessity standard of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
which Congress purposely rendered ambiguous to present a
quick political fix and allow for a permanent judicial resolution
of its interpretation.0 9 With this in mind, the following section
discusses the actual application of these methods to the business
necessity standard of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

304. See id. at 446 ("[T]he notion that administrators may interpret statutes that
they administer is inconsistent with separation of powers principles.")
305. Id. at 430 n.91.
306. Sunstem notes that the Chevron doctrine, in part, contemplates judicial review
of agency interpretations to ensure adherence to the legislative intent behind the
statute. Id. at 446 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 42-46 (1932)).
307. For a more in-depth discussion, see generally Eskridge, supra note 180; Wald,
supra note 184.
308. See generally Sunstem, supra note 56.
309. See Marcus, supra note 4.
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INTERPRETING THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991. APPLICATION OF
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT, TEXTUALIST, AND CHEVRON METHODS

The First Step: The Plain Language of Sectin 105 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991

For the purposes of discussing the Act's standard of business'
necessity, the most relevant provision of the statute is section
105, entitled "Burden of Proof in Disparate Impact Cases."310
More specifically, only sections 105(a)(k)(1)(A)(i) and 105(b)
discuss business necessity and are relevant to tis discussion.
Section 105(a)(k)(1)(A)(i) reads as follows:
[An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact

is established if] a complanng party demonstrates that a
respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes
a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that
the challenged practice is job related for the position in ques311
tion and consistent with business necessity
Under both the legislative intent model and the textualist
approach, the first step in interpreting the phrase "consistent
with business necessity" is to examine the statute to see if its
plain language provides the literal meaning of what "consistent
with business necessity" means.312 The statute does not offer
an explanation of what "consistent with business necessity"
means other than in section 105(b), wich reads:
No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137 CongressionalRecord S 15276 (daily ed.

Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or
applying, any provision of this Act that relates to Wards
313
Cove-Business necessity

310. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75
(amending § 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2).
311. Id. at 1074 (emphasis added).
312. See supra notes 203, 236 and accompanying text.
313. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. at 1075 (emphasis added).
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Looking at the plain language of the statute to derive its
meaning, section 105(b) clearly says that only Senator
Danforth's interpretive memorandum 1 4 shall serve as legislative history when deterining the Act's business necessity standard. Thus, the statute requires a review of that memorandum
only if one relies upon legislative history to determine the legislative intent. Notice, however, that the statute does not provide that one must use the Danforth memorandum to determine
what the business necessity standard is, only that if one relies
upon legislative history, then only the Danforth memorandum
constitutes legislative history
But what if a court places little, or no, value in the legislative
intent model and is not interested in the legislative history* A
Scalia-type textualist would recognize that the language of the
statute is unclear as to how to interpret "consistent with business necessity," yet would reject the legislative intent model.
What steps would a textualist court take in defining business
necessity under the Civil Rights Act of 1991?
The remainder of this Note first applies the legislative intent
model, and then the textualist approach, to determine how a
court employing each method would interpret the Act's business
necessity standard. The importance of this analysis is clear. If
congressional leaders agreed to the compromise language of the
Act under the assumption that the Supreme Court would use
the traditional legislative intent model, their efforts would definitely backfire if Justice Scalia influenced the Court to use a
textualist approach to decide the Act's business necessity standard. If the Court does, in fact, use the textualist approach, it
very well may reiterate its holding in Wards Cove, the holding
that prompted Congress to draft a new civil rights act in the
first place.
This Note also will examine the possible effect of the Chevron
doctrine on the interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In
this analysis, the dispositive question is what interpretation the
EEOC will adopt in administering the Act. The combination of
the Chevron doctrine, a textualist dominated Court, and EEOC

314. 137 CONG. REC. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).

19941

BUSINESS NECESSITY STANDARD

1231

adherence to the Bush Admmstration's pro-Wards Cove interpretation, would ensure a return to the Wards Cove business
necessity standard and just as certainly would implicate a separation of powers crisis.
InterpretingBusiness Necessity: The Legislatwe Intent Model

Under the legislative intent model, a court, after a hopeless
attempt to deduce the meamng of business necessity from the
statutory language, would look at the Danforth interpretive
memorandum as the first step in understanding the legislative
intent. Relevant sections of the memorandum read as follows:
The final compromise on S. 1745 agreed to by several Senate sponsors, including Senators Danforth, Kennedy, and
Dole, and the Admimnstration states that with respect to
-the exclusive legislaWards Cove--[blusmess necessity
tive history is as follows:
The terms "business necessity" and "job related" are intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and m the other Supreme
Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v Atonzo.1 5

This language strongly suggests that Congress disagreed with
the Wards Cove decision and did not want to return to its language or its business necessity standard. Under a traditional
legislative intent scenario, a court also would look to committee
hearings and reports, floor statements and, to a lesser extent,
executive adnmstration statements made during the completion of the bill's enactment. Several typical sources of legislative
history do exist, although the language of the memorandum suggests that these sources do not reflect the legislative intent, as
the "exclusive legislative history" is the second paragraph of the
memorandum only
Even excluding such typical sources of legislative history,
other valid and "intellectually honest" sources exist to guide a
court. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 itself contains further language that, although not related directly to the definition of

315. Id. (citations omitted).
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business
necessity, clearly reveals the intent of the legisla316
ture.
The "Findings" of the Act state that "the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v Atomo has weakened
the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights
protections"3 1' and that "legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful discrimination in employment.""' The "Purposes" of the Act state that the Act seeks "to
codify the concepts of 'business necessity' and 'job related' enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v Duke Power Co., and
in other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing
Co. v Atonlo""
i' and to "respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights
statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination."32
These sections, part of the statutory language that Congress
enacted and the President signed, coupled with the interpretive
memorandum, leave no doubt that the Act intends to overrule
Wards Cove and that the interpretation of business necessity
returns to some position before the Wards Cove ruling. Just
what that position is remains a question of interpreting Griggs,
the difficulties of which this Note discussed previously 32
The problem, of course, is that interpreting Griggs is precisely
what the Supreme Court implied it was doing in Wards
Cove. 2 Couldn't the Court merely interpret the 1991 Act along
the lines of Wards Cove? Clearly not, as the legislative intent

316. Even the textualists agree that looking at the structure of the statute as a
whole is a necessary step in interpreting the statutory language. See Biskupic, supra
note 187, at 917 (discussing comments of Justice White).
317. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071
(citation omitted).
318. Id. § 2(3).
319. Id. § 3(2) (citations omitted).
320. Id. § 3(4).
321. See supra notes 23-44 and accompanying text.
322. Although the Court never explicitly states agreement or disagreement with
Griggs, the Court cites affirmatively to Griggs in stating that "the dispositive issue
is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer." Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atomo, 490 U.S. 642, 659
(1989). Despite the Court's near indifference to Griggs, the Court's statement above
is not the holding of Griggs. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
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discussion above illustrates. 3 The Court should view Wards
Cove as a bottom, and most restrictive, limit of interpreting
business necessity The Act expresses Congress' intent to expand
protection from employment discrimination beyond Wards Cove
and, therefore, by using the legislative intent model of interpreting the Act, a court should interpret business necessity in a
manner more favorable to mnority plaintiffs than did Wards
Cove.
InterpretingBusiness Necessity: The Textualist Approach
As with the legislative history approach, the textualist approach looks first at the general provisions of the Act that pertain specifically to the business necessity standard. These provisions are, of course, the text of section 105 and the interpretive
memorandum of Senator Danforth."4 Use of the latter source
by textualists may appear inconsistent, as textualists disdain
the use of legislative sources. Section 105, however, directs readers to the memorandum and even a textualist would have difficulty ignoring it completely
From a practical standpoint, the textualists' review of the
interpretive memorandum is attractive because the document's
ambiguity provides a convement excuse, under the textualist approach, not to rely on it for guidance. From the textualist perspective, the memorandum may provide a general idea of what
the legislature's intent is, but textualism would require the
memorandum to say specifically what the Act's business necessity standard is before a court legitimately may rely on it.
A textualist might find the memorandum clear enough to use
in interpreting the business necessity standard. A number of
observers join the Court in its belief that Wards Cove reflected
the "true" standard set forth in Griggs.325 If this is the case,
the interpretive memorandum's guidance that "[t]he terms 'business necessity' and 'jobrelated' are intended to reflect the con-

323. See supra notes 310-15 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 310-14 and accompanying text.
325. See Thornburgh Letter, supra note 123. But see Rossem, supra note 124 (arguing that the Court's post-Griggs holdings reflected a different standard than used in
Wards Cove).
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cepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Gnggs
and in the
other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove"32 points
towards a business necessity standard that Wards Cove merely
reiterated. Such reasoning, however, seems counterintuitive if
one notes the memorandum's language of "prior to Wards
Cove." 2 7 Even a textualist would recognize the inconsistency
in continuing the Wards Cove standard of business necessity by
pointing directly to language that instructs the reader not to
consider Wards Cove in interpreting the Act's intent.
More than likely, textualists would arrive at the correct conclusion: that the text itself is not clear. But where a court employing the more traditional method would look to legislative
history for guidance, textualists would bypass legislative history
and look to the "structure and purpose of the law rather than
become involved in the legislative history 32' In looking to the
structure and purpose of the Act, textualists still should look to
other general provisions of the Act. Textualists consider the
statutory language itself the best source for interpreting the
statute. These provisions, discussed above in the section on the
Act's Purposes and Findings would not receive much attention
from strict textualists, such as Justice Scalia. Although
textualists look to the overall structure of the statute to interpret its meaning, they generally are reluctant to place much
weight
on contradictory or ambiguous language in the stat32 9
ute.
If the textualists determined that they could not interpret the
Act in their first level of analysis, they most likely would bypass
any inquiry into legislative history and proceed to a Chevron3 0
type examination.1
Non-textualists could also arrive at the
Chevron stage of inquiry, but such a result is not probable. Use
of the legislative intent model should resolve the interpretive
issue in favor of a more Griggs-like standard of business necessity 331 Nevertheless, examining the interpretation of the Act's

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

137
Id.
See
See
See
See

CONG. REC. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (citations omitted).
supra note 245.
supra notes 280-86 and accompanying text.
supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
supra notes 315-24 and accompanying text.
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business necessity standard in the shadow of Chevron is necessary in the event that the textualist view takes hold of the
Court. In examining the standard as applied under Chevron, we
must look at the agency whose interpretation would
be the sub32

ject of the Supreme Court's scrutiny- the EEOC.

EEOC Interpretatinof the Business Necessity Standard
Prior to the advent of the Clinton Adminstration, the EEOC
derived its interpretation of the Act's business necessity standard from President Bush's statement at the sigmng of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. In his official signing statement of the 1991
Act, President Bush directed that a statement by Senator Dole
in the CongressinalRecord was to serve as "authoritative interpretive guidance by all officials in the executive branch with
respect to the law of disparate impact."333 Senator Dole's exhaustive interpretation stated that "the bill is no longer designed to overrule the meaning of business necessity in Wards
Cove." 34
Senator Dole's statement is legislative history in the most
classic form and should receive no attention from textualists.
Because President Bush ordered executive branch officials to
follow this memorandum, however, Senator Dole's interpretation
rises from the disdain of legislative history to the exalted role of
agency interpretation in the eyes of textualists.
The ability of Senator Dole's interpretation to receive the
textualists' blessing, even indirectly, is particularly troubling
and would be intellectually dishonest of the textualists.
Textualists spare no amount of vitriol in criticizing the legislative intent model's use of legislative history Textualists often
specifically point to congressional debate as useless in understanding congressional intent and emphasize the fact that this
debate usually occurs after the legislation has been drafted, and

332. See supra notes 315-24 and accompanying text.
333. Statement on Sigmng the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27 WEEKLY COMP PRES.
Doc. 1701, 1702 (Nov. 21, 1991).
334. 137 CONG. REC. S15,472-01, S15,475 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Statement of
Sen. Dole).
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Senator Danforth

drafted his interpretive memorandum prior to completion of
section 10536 and section 105 specifically refers to the
Danforth memorandum as indicative of the Act's intent.337 Furthermore, Congress voted on and the President approved section
105's reference to the interpretive memorandum (as part of the
entire Act).338 If President Bush disagreed with Senator
Danforth's interpretation, he could have vetoed the 1991 Act.
Yet to a textualist, such debate statements are worth little attention. Senator Dole made his statement, however, after the
drafting of section 105 was complete and was never referred to
in the Act at all. 39 In addition, Congress never voted on Senator Dole's statement nor did Congress present it to the President
for his approval. 4 ' Yet, because President Bush directed executive agencies to follow the Dole interpretation, such truly spurious legislative history served as agency interpretation during
the remainder of the Bush Administration. 4 '
The EEOC followed President Bush's order, 4 ' a decision not
surprising in light of the fact that EEOC Chairman Evan Kemp

335. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 215, at 54-55.

336. In fact, Senator Danforth wrote the memorandum during the negotiation process in drafting the Act's final form. Both were released on October 25, 1991. See
137 CONG. REC. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).

337. See supra note 161.
338. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
339. The final language of the Act, in the final form of Senate Bill 1745, was released October 25, 1991, and Senator Dole did not make those comments until October 30, 1991.
340. Id.
341. See supra note 333; see also Lawyers' Committee Urges Changed Strategy in
Enforcing Federal Civil Rights Statutes, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at A-6 (Jan.
11, 1993) [hereinafter Lawyers' Committee].
Neither the Department of Justice nor the EEOC has issued a definitive statement of how the Court will interpret business necessity under the new Act. In light
of President Clinton's election to the White House, the Department of Justice probably will not follow the Danforth interpretation and will advocate a business necessity
standard closer to the pre-Wards Cove view. The Court, however, would probably
look to the EEOC as the lead agency in defining policy in this matter. The Court
would be correct to look to the EEOC first, for the EEOC's mission is to advocate
for civil rights in the workplace. The EEOC's interpretation, however, may very well
be at odds with both the Clinton Administration and the Danforth memorandum.
342. See id. (following Bush's order although no official EEOC statement was made
to that effect).
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served as one of President Bush's point men in attacking House
Bill 1 and the subsequent congressional proposals. In fact,
Kemp's interpretation of the business necessity standard was
consistent with the Bush Admmstration throughout 1991.
On June 24, 1991, Kemp sent a letter to White House Chief of
Staff John Sununu concermng an early proposal by Senator
John Danforth. 4 3 Kemp stated that any definition of business
necessity tied to job performance would "make it extremely difficult, if not impossible for employers to show that use of educational credentials and objective measures of academic achievement are legally defensible." 3" Kemp's letter also said that employers "will have little choice but to revert to hiring by the
numbers," if business necessity were tied to job performance. 4 5
Kemp's position during the debate over the Civil Rights Act was
clearly on the side of the Bush Administration and in favor of
adopting the Wards Cove approach to business necessity
After passage of the Act, Kemp and the EEOC drew criticism
from civil rights advocates for using a restrictive interpretation
of the Act, 346 primarily with respect to the agency's refusal to
seek retroactive enforcement of the Act.347 In oversight hearings before the Senate, Senator Kennedy attacked Kemp's position on the Act. 'You're charged as an independent agency to
root out discrimination and you've chosen to adopt the narrower
interpretation
That sends a powerful negative message. , 48
With Bill Clinton's victory over George Bush, Kemp is no
longer the chairman of the EEOC-nor do Republican appointees dominate the EEOC. 34 9 Their actions in the wake of the

343. Administration Officials Target Moderate Republican Civil Rights Bill, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 124, at A-15 (June 27, 1991).
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Employment: EEOC Performance, Restrictive Stand on 1991 Act Attacked on
Capitol Hill, Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) No. 83, at A-10 (Apr. 29, 1992) [heremafter EEOC Performance]; see also Lawyers' Committee, supra note 341.
347. EEOC Performance, supra note 346.
348. Id.
349. Kemp resigned from the EEOC effective April 2, 1993, even though he could
have stayed on until the end of 1993. EEOC Chairman Kemp Will Leave Agency
April 2, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 57, at A-7 (Mar. 26, 1993); EEOC's Kemp Tells
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passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, however, illustrate the
powerful influence of the EEOC in interpreting the Act's business necessity standard. It seems commonsensical that judicial
interpretation of such an important law should not turn on
which political party controls the EEOC when this issue inevitably reaches the Court. Nevertheless, such a result is not out of
the question. 5 0 As such, civil rights advocates should take
heed and not view the ascension of the Clinton Adnnmstration-and any possible shift in the EEOC's interpretation 3 5 -- as bringing finality to the question of how to interpret
the 1991 Civil Rights Act's business necessity standard. The
ultimate interpretation of this standard lies in the future, with
the federal courts. 52
INTERPRETING THE CiviL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991. THE CORRECT
INTERPRETATION MAY NOT BE THE ACTUAL INTERPRETATION

The general concerns of textualists with respect to statutory
interpretation are valid and deserve considerable attention by
all members of the judiciary Concern that judges are too quick
to play a legislative role unnecessarily is well founded, but the
answer to these concerns is not an indiscriminate ban on examining legislative intent.

Clinton He Will Stay at Civil Rights Agency Until Successor Is Named, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at A-7 (Jan. 26, 1993); see also Departing EEOC General Counsel Sees Need for New Direction at Overwhelmed Agency, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
111, at D-3 (June 11, 1993) [hereinafter New Direction at EEOC] (discussing President Clinton's opportunity to fill two vacancies on the five-person commission).
350. See supra notes 287-306 and accompanying text.
351. See Lawyers' Committee, supra note 341 (calling for the Clinton Administration
to withdraw President Bush's directive regarding the interpretation of the 1991 Act's
business necessity standard). No formal policy change has been announced, as of this
writing, nor has President Bush's directive been formally withdrawn by President
Clinton. It seems likely, however, that the Clinton EEOC will opt for the Danforth,
rather than the Dole, interpretation when confronted with this issue. For example,
the EEOC has already reversed the Bush EEOC on the question of whether the
1991 Act applies retroactively. EEOC Reiterates Vote to Change Policy on Retroactivity of 1991 Civil Rights Act, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 71, at A-1 (Apr. 15, 1993);
cf. New Direction at EEOC, supra note 349 (outgoing EEOC General Counsel, Donald Livingston, predicting that the Clinton EEOC will make "very few policy changes").
352. See supra note 11.
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Just as the Civil Rights Act of 1991's provision for business
necessity is a classic example of irresponsible legislating, so too
is the Act an excellent example of a case in which deriving a
general intent of the legislature is fairly simple. Congress' intent
was to overturn Wards Cove and provide greater civil rights
protections in the work place than were previously available.
Notwithstanding Senator Dole's statement of October 30,
1991-and even not considering, for the moment, the Danforth
interpretive memorandum-the statutory language itself explicitly reveals the legislature's intent, as shown in the Act's Findings and Purposes.
Because the Act gives a clear understanding of its general
intent, not to search further for more specific intent would be
unreasonable; thus, the mission of the legislative intent model.
The textualist approach would lead to an interpretation that
runs completely counter to the Act's stated purpose. Further, the
textualist approach could arrive at its interpretation through a
method more convoluted and suspect than the legislative intent
model at its worst.
The ambiguity of the Act's business necessity standard leaves
its ultimate definition to the Federal Courts-courts currently
dominated by Reagan and Bush appointees. Quite possibly,
therefore, the courts will interpret "consistent with business
necessity" more in line with the Wards Cove standard than the
Gnggs standard. If this is the case, did the Bush Adminstration
really compromise? Did it really "lose"? Or did the Admmstration make the best of a bad political environment and outsmart
its congressional opponents? We may not know the answer to
these questions until the Supreme Court addresses the issue of
disparate impact discrimination again. The Civil Rights Act of
1991 may not overrule Wards Cove with respect to business
necessity Despite the Act's other substantive accomplishments,
it very well may be a civil rights failure on its most important,
and most contentious, issue.

Philip S. Runkel

